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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
A Case for Incorporating Sales 
Constraints in the Theory of the Firm 
Traditional marginalist theory of the firm, as it evolved from the 
time of Cournot, is mathematically speaking, most elegant in the case 
of pure unilateral monopoly. Implicit in the deterministic, partial 
equilibrium framework, in which the optimization problem for a firm is 
posed, is a distinction between the interdependence of the first order 
of smallness and that of a higher order. The whole economy is divided 
into industries producing similar products. There are two types of 
interdependence among these industries that are brought into prominence 
in a general equilibrium analysis. In the first place, the industry 
may produce intermediate goods that are used as inputs by the other 
industries. But even when it produces only final goods, it competes 
with other industries for the consumers' dollar. Secondly, each industry 
is directly or indirectly related with other industries, as it is shown 
in an input-output table, because of its purchase of inputs from other 
industries and productive services from the household sectors. 
However, any marginal change in the price or offer variation in any 
particular industry (which, itself, is of first-order of smallness, 
by definition) is diffused, in a random manner, over the rest of the 
economy so that the impact felt by any firm, or a group of firms, not 
in the same industry, could, at most, be of only the second-order of small­
ness. Under such conditions the ceteris paribus assumption about the 
rest of the economy holds (Olson and McFarland, 1962). 
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A pure monopolist is the only firm in the industry. Hence, the 
rest of the economy is a passive shock absorber of any chain reaction 
pattern transmitted throughout the \3conomy by a marginal change in its 
price-output policy. As there is no feedback, the monopolist is faced 
with a known determinate demand function relating the price that would 
clear the market with the amount offered by it. Assuming that the firm 
purchases all its inputs in a pure competitive market, it would have 
a determinate cost function as well. Such a situation is tailor-made 
for the application of infinitesimal calculus. If the demand function 
depends also on the rate of change of price, we obtain another tailor-
made situation for the application of variational calculus (Evans, 
1930; Tintner, 1942). 
In all other market situations, a determinate result is obtained 
only by introducing some behavioristic ritual as a supplement to (or 
as one may argue, as a substitute for) the usual profit maximizing rule. 
In the case of a duopoly or oligopoly situation such behavioristic ritual 
(or decision rule, as it is called in a game-theoretic context) is made 
explicit. However, even if it is not made explicit, it permeates 
through the entire analytical scaffolding. 
Take the case of a large group of symmetrical firms producing branded 
but close substitute products. One decision rule is that each firm would 
produce that output at which its marginal cost is equated with marginal 
revenue based on a ceteris paribus 'dd' curve facing it. However, 
if all the firms in the industry (including new entrants, if any) behave 
according to the same decision rule, the expectation of each firm is always 
falsified unless the group equilibrium is reached, as the market evolves 
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according to the mutatis mutandis "DD" curve with a much flatter slope. 
It may be noted that the expectations would be fulfilled at group 
equilibrium only if they are generated by the same decision rule as 
before. The position of such a firm is therefore not much different 
from a Cournot-type duopolist. 
The ingenuity of Chamberlin (1965) lies in seeing that such an 
"as if monopolist" elasticity-induced price-quantity adjustment on the 
basis of the "dd" curve is more reasonable in the above large-group case 
than in an oligopoly, or duopoly situation, though ultimately it has 
the effect of wiping out any profit in equilibrium, an "as if competitive" 
outcome. As the effect of any marginal change of price-output policy 
of a firm would be spread thin over the entire group, it would tend 
to become of second-order of smallness as the number of firms in the 
group becomes larger and larger. So there would not be any oligopolistic 
reaction on the part of other firms in the group as a result of the 
action of any particular firm. Since the state of the market, as 
reflected by the "DD" curve, is a result of their joint action, it would 
not do to argue that any firm in a depressed market would not cut price 
"for the fear of spoiling the market" since the firm does not have 
to pay a penalty commensurate with its own contribution to the tilting 
of the "DD" curve. In the absence of any collusive arrangement each 
firm would follow its own self-interest. Similarly, in a sellers' 
market, each firm may "make hay while the sun shines" by going for a 
"fleeting surplus profit," charging an unduly high price and thus 
attracting more firms into the industry than would be optimal for its 
long-run interests (Paul, 1954). However, the reasonableness of such 
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a behavioristic ritual has not gone unchallenged in the polemical 
literature on the "doctrine of excess capacity" (Harrod, 1952, 1967; 
Hicks, 1954; Hahn, 1955; Edwards, 1955; Lydell, 1955). 
The decision rule implied in the "pure competitive behavior" of a 
firm is even simpler, namely each firm will take the ruling price, p, 
as parametrically given. Under such a decision rule, the equilibrium 
of the industry can be studied in isolation from the equilibrium of 
the firm. 
Assume that each firm has a determinate cost function that is 
convex and piecewise-smooth, i.e., has continuous derivative with 
respect to output except at some corner points, where both the left-
hand and right-hand derivatives exist, within its admissible region 
of output variation. The lower end-point of the admissible region 
is given by zero output at which the right-hand derivative of the 
cost function exists. The upper end-point of the admissible region 
is given by the capacity output of the firm at which the left-hand 
derivative of the cost function exists. The right-hand derivative of the 
cost function may be called fmc, the forward marginal cost, 
and the left-hand derivative of the cost function may 
be called backward marginal cost or bmc. Since each firm is a price-
taker (i.e., a price-fixed quantity adjuster) at any price, p, it 
will supply a definite quantity. Let S^(p) be the amount supplied by 
the i""^ producer at price p, and be its capacity output. S^(p) = 0 
if fmc is higher than p at EL=0 and throughout the admissible region 
tVi — — 
of output variation for the 1 firm. S^(p) = if bmc at is less 
than or equal to p. In all other cases, bmc s pS fmc for some S^, 
5 
0 < < S^. If bmc 4 fmc, then = S^(p). If bmc = fmc, then we 
need a further check to see whether at S^(-) just below S^, fmc is less 
than p or not. If yes, then = S^(p) once again. If not, then 
there would be some other > S^, for which bmc ^  p ^  fmc and 
Si = S^(p); or bmc ^  p up to S^, when S^(p) = S,^. By aggregating 
over all the firms in the industry we get the supply of the industry 
at a given price, 
n 
(1) S(p) = Z S.(p), 
i=l 
where n is the number of firms (indexed by i) in the industry. 
By varying the price parametrically, we generate the supply 
function, S(p), of the industry which might b;- assumed to be continuous 
and single-valued^ with the following properties: 
(i) S ^  S(p) 2 0; p a 0 
(2) (ii) S(p) = 0 for 0 ^  p ^ p 
(iii) 5(p) = S for p ^ p > 0 
where £ is the highest price at which no supply will be forthcoming iiiLo 
the market and p is the lowest price at which supply reaches its upper 
limit S. 
If the marginal cost of the "marginal firm" is positive, £ will 
exist. S may be interpreted as the sum total of the output capacities 
^We shall make the distinction between a "function" and a "cor­
respondence." The adjective "single-valued" is therefore redundant. 
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(technical output limits) of the firms in the industry in a given time 
period 
n 
(3) S = Z S.. 
i=l 
Let there be one and only one price at which the market will take the 
quantity S > 0. Define p = Y(S) as the market clearing price of S. An 
equilibrium price is defined as the price p at which p = Y(S(p )) and 
S(p*) > 0. 
Proposition 1 
Let Y(S) be continuous in S, 0 < S < S. An equilibrium price 
(at which the expectations are realized) will exist if the following 
conditions hold; 
(4) lim Y(S) >p; lim Y(S) & p 
S-+0+ S-vS-
Proof 
Define F(p) = v(Sfp)) - p, p r (p, p) 
Since p is the highest price at which S(p) = 0, S(p) >0 for p e (£, "p) . 
Hencc, F(p) is defined and continuous in p e (_£, p) as Y(S) is defined 
and continuous on (0, S). 
For any e >0, F(£ + e ) =Y (S(£ + e )) - £ - e 
As e -y 0 + 
f (£ +) ~ Y (0 +) - £ > 0; by 4 . 
Hence, there exists some 6 >0, for which F(£ + 6) >0, since F(p) 
is continuous on (£, p). 
7 
(5) Atp; F(p) = Y(S(p)) - p = Y(S) - p ^ 0 
since Y(S) is right continuous at S. If the equality in 5 holds then 
— "ic — — 
p = p and S(p) = S > 0. 
If the inequality holds in 5 , then by the intermediate value 
theorem there exist a p, at which F(p) = 0, p e (£ + 6, p), since 
F(p) is continuous on (p + 5, p). 
But then Y(S(p)) = p. So p = p , and S(p) >0, as p >£. 
: * , * , * 1 
Let E = ^  p I p = Y(S(p ))j 
At any p ^ E, the pure competitive firm is not much different from a 
Cournot duopolist, whose expectations are always falsified at a price 
not belonging to an equilibrium set. Moreover, if the adjustment 
process is lagged, as in cobweb models, p may not converge to some 
* 
p e E as t -y 00. 
The usual justification for the "competitive behavior" of the firm, 
however, assumes that adjustment of S^ to p is instantaneous. Moreover, 
the output supplied by the firm is always an infinitely small portion 
of the total industrial output. Hence, the market-clearing pricc, 
p, is not affected by any change in the i'"^ firm's output. 
To put it mathematically; 
-C' _ 
(6) = 0, 0 ^  S.s: S. ; for any i=l, 2, ... n. 
Oo^ 11 
This immediately suggests that Y(S) has horizontal segments and 
n 
is evaluated within such a segment of Y(S) function. Since S = ZS.; 
^i i=l ^ 
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(7) H- = Y'(S) If- = Y'(S). 
i i 
(We are assuming that n is finite. Otherwise ZS. would not converge.) 
i ^ 
If the capacity constraint is removed, there is no guarantee that 
as is increased it would not hit any corner point of Y(S). Moreover 
if is not bounded it cannot always remain an infinitely small portion 
of S as is increased since and S are both real, i.e., belong 
to a field that is Archemedean. 
To sum up, since Y(S) cannot be constant in S for 0 < S ^  S, it 
can at most have some horizontal segments. The competitive behavior 
of a firm is plausible only if the underlying supply (or cost) conditions 
imposes a capacity limit for the firm.^ However, even then a sales 
restraint exists up to which the firm can dispose of any quantity at a 
constant price--if the adjustment of output to price is instantaneous. 
n 
If not, the market clearing price p will depend on 2S., which is not 
i=l ^ 
known to the firm, nor can be controlled by it. This anomaly in 
competitive behavior is discussed by Arrow (1959) and Dickson (1961). 
The reason for this anomaly lies in 7 . Any marginal change in the 
output supplied by the i^^ firm is of the same order of smallness as a 
marginal change in the supply of the industry. Therefore y'(S) does 
not involve n, the number of firms in the industry. 
^This is clearly stated by Bishop (1952). 
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Moreover, it may be noted that if Y(S) has horizontal segments then 
it is not invertible. So the demand function in its usual sense does 
not exist, as more or less than a specific quantity can be sold at the 
same price. 
A somewhat different type of demand function is increasingly 
being used in operational research literature and has also penetrated economic 
literature, especially in the formulation of capacity expansion policy 
for a firm. In these models there is a demand function, which is a 
univariate function of time. In inventory models, this means that the 
firm produces according to order and the order rate is independent of 
the parameters in the action space of the firm. In stochastic versions, 
the analysis is generally restricted to the case of a probability distribu­
tion of demand which does not change over time or to the case of a 
fixed order rate but the time at which it occurs is a random variable. 
This type of demand function has been used by Chenery (1952), 
Smith (1961), Arrow and his associates (1958), Manne and his associates 
(1967), and Zabel (1963), to determine a program of optimum growth of 
capacity for the firm. However, the interpretation of the demand 
function is not the same in each case. Chenery, Smith and Zabel 
regard d(t) as fixed output requirements over time. Chenery, however, 
focuses attention on a special situation in which the time derivative 
of d(t) is a constant. In both cases, the demand can neither be back-
logged nor can be met from inventory accumulated from previous production. 
So d(t) is also the optimum output program over time and the problem 
for the firm is to minimize the cost of satisfying the output requirements 
by choosing an optimum capacity policy. In Manne type models, demand 
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can be backlogged at a finite (penalty) cost which is equivalent to 
assuming that the deficit can be met by purchasing from the market (or 
importing from abroad). A somewhat similar idea also appears in 
Dantzig's (1963) two-stage programming under uncertainty in which 
"permanent feasibility" is maintained. In Arrow type models d(t) provides 
a sales constraint up to which the firm can sell at a given market price 
but beyond which it cannot sell at any positive price. In the context 
of a multi-product firm, Kornai and Liptak (1962) have introduced 
a similar idea by providing for some "market acceptance limits" for 
different brands of a product of the same firm. Hans Brems (1961) has 
also suggested incorporating sales constraints (and keeping price 
frozen) in a programming framework. In his model, the quality and 
selling efforts needed to sell one unit of a product are fully specified 
by a "process" the elements of which specify the physical units of the 
i^^ input per physical unit of output of the process, i.e., to 
produce and sell one unit of the process. 
Besides the usefulness of the concept of a sales constraint in a 
multi-product context, one chief merit of such a concept (and the type 
of demand function it implies) is its easy adaptability to a theory 
of growth of a firm in a partial equilibrium framework. Since the 
firm does not have any price or selling policy, it simplifies the 
theory. At any time the firm operates under two constraints. One 
is the sales limit, growing exogeneously over time and not amenable 
to control. The other is its capacity limit, a state variable, but 
amenable to control by some control variables which determine the rate 
of change of capacity over time. 
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But what is the market structure under which such a demand function 
would be plausible? In the first place the firm is like a pure monopolist 
with a determinate demand function, i.e., it is not bothered by industry 
effects. If the price is set independently of the firm's control (by 
a marketing board) then the firm is a price-taker. However, the firm 
can also be a price-maker, if it sets a price and waits for orders to 
pile up. The essential feature is that the firm has no "price" or selling 
policy worth the name and the sales limit is independent of the firm's 
action parameters. 
Mills (1962) tried to bridge the gap between such a demand func­
tion and the usual demand function of economic textbooks by bringing 
in inventory and uncertainty. The objective function is accordingly 
modified so as to maximize the mathematical expectation of profit. 
We shall follow here an alternative route. We shall assume that 
all goods produced by the firm are nonstorable. If the price function 
is not time-dependent, i.e., constant over time, this would result 
in no loss of generality as there would be no speculative motive for 
holding inventories. Besides,no stochastic elements would be introduced. 
We should, in their place, introduce a marketing cost function. One 
part of the marketing expense is proportional to the amount sold. The 
other part would be a quadratic function of the ratio of amount sold 
to the sales limit. In the rest of this section, a justification for 
this type of marketing cost function will be given. 
Let d be the sales limit and x be the amount sold. Consider the 
logarithmic penalty function m log (1 " •j)j m > 0. When x = 0, the penalty 
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is zero. When x = d, the penalty is - «> . If this penalty function is 
added to the net revenue function and the firm maximizes their algebraic 
sum then x will always be less than d. The logarithmic penalty function, 
however, imposes an infinite penalty as x-> d from left. Its first 
infinity asx 4 d. We can call x/d as the market penetration index. 
Let us expand the above penalty function: We get 
provided x< d. Since all the terms are negative, we get an underestimate 
of the penalty function if we keep only up to quadratic terms, i.e., 
As X -* 0, the penalty is zero as before. If x-^ d, then the penalty 
is which is finite if m is finite. 
The interpretation of this pe-"ilty function is simple. Suppose 
the firm produces at a given point but sells in different markets 
located uniformly over space. By drawing Von Thvinen type concentric 
circles with the center at the production location, it can easily be 
shown that the marketing cost will become larger as the firm tries to 
sell more. In the first place transport cost may be assumed to be 
proportional to the Euclidean distance between the market location and 
the production location. Moreover, the further it goes, the more it 
will encroach on the markets of other producers located nearby. Note 
that if we make p a function of x, then as x increases not only the 
price will decrease for the marginal units but for all units. However, 
which also tends to minus 
0 s X < d 
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by introducing marketing cost, the net price (i.e., price net of marketing 
cost) will still be decreasing as the marketing cost is an increasing 
function of x. But in the markets near the production location, the 
net price will remain the same. 
To recapitulate, a sales constraint is implicit even for a pure 
competitive firm. But this never becomes binding because cost 
or other constraints become binding before the sales constraint is 
reached. In the operations research literature the sales constraint 
is introduced explicitly and the cost situation is not such that an 
optimal size of firm exists in a long-run situation. By introducing 
a marketing cost function a compromise between the two approaches 
is possible. 
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CHAPTER II. SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
The Notions of Fixed, Semi-fixed 
and Variable Cost; The Concept of Capacity 
In the Walrasian view, the firm is a pure "hirer-seller" with no 
scarce factors private to it. As a result, all its costs are variable 
(Kuenna, 1963). Usually, however, the total cost of a firm is written 
as the sum of fixed costs, a constant and variable cost. 
Now why does this constant appear? A simple answer would be that 
these are fixed charges like taxes which are liabilities to the firm 
imposed by social institutions. Variable costs are then the minimum 
cost of a given output subject to the constraints of the production 
function and the price function of inputs that "went" into the product, 
or simply all costs that the firm would be interested in minimizing. 
Such a viewpoint can be found in Samuelson (1965). 
There are two problems with the above cost classification. In 
the first place, even coatractual or statutory obligations might vary 
with the designated inputs and outputs. Secondly, most economists 
regard costs as events that occur with factors of production in use 
(Noyes, 1941). We are thus led to the more fundamental question, what 
is cost of production for a firm? In economic literature a straight­
forward answer to the above question is avoided. It is argued that 
the concept of cost has different shades of meaning and it is a 
relative concept. Yet one can distinguish between two distinct notions 
of cost (Fellner, 1960). 
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1. The cost of production of a given output is the value to 
other producers of the resources which are used to produce 
it. A clear exposition of this concept of cost can be found 
in Lewis (1949), Stigler (1952), and Machlup (1952). This 
is "cost" in a welfare-theoretic sense. 
2. The human efforts and sacrifices which are involved in making 
the factors available for use, i.e., real cost. 
Such theoretical notions of cost can be of value only in a general 
equilibrium analysis. In a partial equilibrium it is almost imperative 
to adopt a more simplistic notion of cost, namely, the total expense 
of production that is incurred on account of factors of production. 
A distinction is often made between fixed and variable productive 
services (Carlson, 1965; Stigler, 1952). Fixed productive services 
flow from fixed productive factors that give rise to "inescapable, 
contractual" cost in a given period though it is still cost, being 
escapable in a longer period. Here again we can distinguish between 
two lines of thought. The popular view is that'fixed factor^'are those 
factors that for some reason or other cannot be varied even though 
they are "scarce." These factors are the "microeconomic counterparts" 
of land and other primary factors in general equilibrium analysis. 
Carlson, on the other hand, gives the impression that he is thinking 
of "discontinuity factors" which are only step-wise variable. He 
does not make a distinction between a fixed factor (which does not 
vary with the amount produced) and its service-flow (which depends on 
the rate of utilization of the factor). But in his mono-periodic 
theory, the firm is assumed to have all its resources in liquid forms 
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at the beginning of the period and use up all its productive services, 
bought at the beginning of the period, within the production period. 
Thus it appears that the optimum amount of a fixed productive factor, 
for at least a given range of output variation, is the same as otherwise 
in p. mono-periodic situation the firm would not purchase more or less 
of the "fixed" productive factor than what is "optimally" necessary. 
Similarly, in his poly-periodic theory, Carlson makes a sharp distinc­
tion between the fixed and variable nature of productive service 
and the durable (i.e., which appears in more than one period) and non­
durable nature of productive service. 
Most economists, I presume, associate with the notion of fixed 
costs, a certain immobility or irreversibility of factors that is completely 
alien to Carlson's notion of fixed cost. Unfortunately, both Marshall 
(1961) and J. M. Clark (1923) who popularized such a concept of 
"supplementary" or "overhead" cost are also great believers in the 
relativity of cost concepts. To Marshall, which factors are to be 
regarded as fixed and which are variable depends on the length of time 
one considers. Sometimes this may lead to a logical circle. 
Thus, Viner (1931) defines the short run as the period which is long 
enough to permit any desired change of output technologically possible 
without altering the "scale of the plant." He then defines the "scale 
of plant" as the group of factors which are fixed in amount in the 
short run. 
Like Marshall, J. M. Clark also illustrates how we may choose from 
a host of "ad hoc" cost concepts in different real-life situations, 
confronted with various kinds of managerial problems. In recent years 
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the above line of approach has further been extended by Dean (1951) 
and a group of French economists (Lessourne, 1963). 
Since we have a definite end in view, namely to formulate the 
theory of growth of a firm, it is not unreasonable to expect that we 
should, once for all, adopt a cost-classification scheme and stick 
to it. With this purpose in view, let us start with the simplest 
situation, i.e., a single-product firm subject to the constraint of a 
production function when the price functions of factors are known. 
First of all, we make the old-fashioned distinction between (i) 
current inputs whose consumption is contemporaneous with current 
production and (ii) capital goods, which contribute to the production 
process by their mere presence. They are imperfectly substitutable 
for each other. 
We assume that all current input items have a perfect market, 
in the sense that (i) their purchase price is always the same as their 
selling price, (ii) there is no lag of delivery, the purchase of 
these items can be postponed to the last moment if required and (iii) 
an organized future market exists where prices are so adjusted that 
at any time there is no gain from speculative holding of these items. 
Under the above conditions it would never pay the firm to have 
an excess supply (or inventory) of these items. 
Let us define an operational period as a week. No change in 
prices of current inputs can take place within a week. Besides at 
the end of the week there are no goods-in-process. We assume that 
output produced is nonstorable, hence sold at the end of the week. 
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Since all current-cost items that are made available to the firm 
are consumed, they are inputs, i.e., their available supply over 
the week is equal to their total use. So both current inputs and output 
have the dimensionality of units per week. 
Capital goods are stock inputs of varying degrees of durability 
(requiring regular maintenance and replacement,if necessary) and are 
irreversible in the sense that though they are freely variable at the 
time of their installation, once they are installed they can no 
longer be varied except by installing a parallel line or by replacing 
with a larger line, in the upward direction, or allowing the forces of 
mortality to work on them in the downward direction. 
Let us now consider the production function of the firm. The 
most usual form of production function expresses the flow of output 
as a function of flow of inputs in a momentary production. Each flow 
of service has the dimension of the unit of service per moment. The 
flow of output has also the same dimension. 
A departure from the above classical position is often made to 
deal with the special case of fixed coefficients of production or 
limitatlonal inputs (Georgescu-Roegen, 1965; Dan^, 1966). The production 
function, implicit in the L-shaped isoquants, for instance, is a 
relation of output and the available "supply" of factors of production. 
When we consider "the week" as the operational period, the above two 
lines of approach do not make any difference with respect to current 
inputs. Haavelmo (1960) discusses the concept of capacity in relation 
to both classical and nonclassical types of production function. 
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If we measure the capital goods or the stock inputs by their 
physical size and both output and current inputs by their respective 
units per week, we get a hybrid kind of production function. Such 
a stock-flow production function has been used by Smith (1961) and 
Sen and Sengupta (1969). Smith's production function is a simplifi­
cation of engineering type production functions, A similar type of 
production function, which also makes a distinction between divisible 
capital goods and indivisible capital good^ has been used by Chenery 
(1952). 
The virtue of this type of production function is, that under certain 
simplifying assumptions, it helps to illustrate the various concepts 
of capacity of the firm. Let us introduce the simplifying assumptions 
first. 
Al. All capital goods (plants) (i) are of constant efficiency 
with a fixed life L, determined by technical considera­
tions, (say, by obsolescence rate), and hence there is no 
user cost; (ii) they have no scrap value. 
A2. Each firm has one plant, so that there is no ambiguity 
about the (physical) size of a plant, denoted by k. We 
assume that L is measured in weeks and it is a positive 
integer. 
Define 
(8) E(w) = E(q(w), k) = a(w) + v(x)*x(w) + c(w), 0^ q(w) ^  q(k) 
where a(w) is the cost per week which is independent of the plant size. 
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k and the output rate,q(w), i.e., fixed cost in Carlson's sense 
(a(w) 2 0); x(w) = x(q(w), k) is the physical dimension of all current 
inputs used up contemporaneously with output produced in a given week, 
q(w); and v(x) is its appropriate price index, assumed to be independent 
of time (x(w) ^  0; v(x) >0). c(w) is the current cost equivalent of 
c(k), the (initial) cost of purchasing (or constructing) k, i.e., 
the cost of the capital stock k, allocated to the given week; 
and q(k), is the technical upper limit, assumed to be a monotonically 
increasing function of k, the plant size. Equation 8 defines a one-
parameter family of short-run cost functions (parameterized by k, 
the size of the plant) defined for weekly output rate q(w) where 
0 5 q(w) 5 'q(k). For a given k, E(w) becomes the usual short-run cost 
function. Let r, 0 < r < 1, be the rate of interest (as well as the 
rate of discount for the firm) that can be earned on a perfectly 
riskless security worth one dollar. Then one way of defining c(w) 
would be 
If L ™, we get c(w) = rc(k), which is Smith's definition of 
"current cost" of maintaining the "presence" of a unit of the capital 
good in production. If r is replaced by the normal rate of profit 
(Mrs. Robinson's term (1969X indicating the rate at which no entry or 
exit would be made into the industry) or "the standard rate of profit" 
(Harrod's term (1952) meaning thereby the rate at which the firm 
would be on the point of indifference regarding investing in the same 
industry) we get alternative methods of deriving "supplementary cost" 
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which gives U-shapedaess to the average cost curve, E(w)/q(w). 
We prefer 9 because it can simply be interpreted as "amortiza­
tion cost." Assuming all amortization funds are invested at the market 
rate of interest, c(w) accumulated over L weeks would be equal to 
c(k). Secondly, the above way of allocating c(k) seems reasonable if 
the "earning power" of k is the same in each week, which would be 
true by virtue of the following assumption. 
A3. Each plant is designed (by an engineer) with a particular 
output rate (q^(w)) in mind which the firm produces under 
identical demand conditions over L weeks. 
The optimum plant size for the designed rate of output is there­
fore given by the following cost minimization problem; 
L 
(10) Min z E(q (w), k)/(l+r) 
k w=l 
= l^-j^l - (1+r) /rj . Min E (q^(w), k). 
k 
We assume: 
A4. k can be designed for any specific rate of output q^^w) to 
be produced over L weeks and is a strictly increasing 
function of q^C")• 
Suppose the solution of the above minimization problem is given 
by k^ for a given q^(w). By varying q^(w), parametrically, we can 
generate the (nonspecific) extremal, k^ = F(q^(w)), which, by A3, 
is invertible. It may be noted that F is independent of k, as it is 
minimized out in 10 , Hence for each value of q^fw) s 0, we can derive 
the following Engineers' cost function: 
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(11) E^(w) = E(v^(w) , F(q^(w)). 
It can easily be seen that since 10 implies ÔE(q^(w), k^)/ôk=0, the 
Engineer's cost function is the envelope cost function of the one 
parameter family of short-run cost functions, 8 , 
(11a) ôE(q(w), k)/ôk = 0 
E(w) = E(q(w), k) 
Hence, 11 is also what is called the "long-run" cost function. By 
A3.Eg(w) is strictly increasing in q^(w), ^^(w) ^  0. Suppose that it 
is also concave up to 0 < q (w) ^  q (w) and convex after q (w), which 
r ^00 ^oo 
is the inflection point of E^(w), i.e., the point where "scale 
economies" are exhausted. 
Since in geometrical arguments it is more convenient to deal with 
"average curves" we may state the following results, without proof, 
as they are already stated or proved (more or less rigorously) in 
economic literature. 
Rl. Divide E^(q^(w)) by . This gives us long-run average 
cost which is the envelope cost function (or k-discrirainiant 
locus) of the one parameter family of short-run average 
cost curve E(q(w), k)/q(w). The point at which the 
above two curves would be tangential to each other is also 
where 8 is tangential to 11 , or namely at q^(w), (the 
conjugate point). 
R2. The point q^^(w) is the minimum point of the long-run average 
cost curve as defined in Rl. 
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R3. Define q^(k) as the minimum point of the average short-run cost 
curve for a given k. It can be shown that the marginal 
short-run cost would be equal to average short-run cost 
at q^(k). In other words 
ôE(q(w), k)/a q(w) =E(q(w), k)/q(w) 
both evaluated at q(w) = q^(k). 
R4. Consider q (w) and find the k that corresponds to it, 
^00 ' oo 
in k = F(q (w)). If for a firm k = k , then q (w) 
oo 00 00 00 
is also the same as q^tk^^), i.e., the minimum point of the 
short-run average cost curve E(q(w), k^^)/q(w). 
R5. Given any arbitrarily given k it is possible that the 
output produced is not the same as the output for which 
it is designed. We can still find the output rate for 
which k is designed by inverting the F function and evaluating 
it at k. It would create no confusion if we also call 
it q^fw). 
Since F is invertible (by A4), f ^(k). But k = k^ = F(q^(w)). 
It can be seen that q^tw) is the conjugate point of E(q(w), k) as defined 
in Rl. By varying k parametrically, we get q^(k). Economic literature 
is replete with various concepts of capacity of (i) a plant, (ii) a 
firm, (iii) an industry and lastly (iv) an economy as a whole under 
the conditions of sustained simultaneous operations. Let us illustrate 
some of the concepts of capacity of a firm, for our one-product, one-
plant firm, assuming v(x) and L are given, but the demand conditions 
are subject to change so that q(w) may not be equal to q^^w) over all 
L weeks. 
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a. The simplest (and economically speaking, simplistic) 
concept of capacity of a firm with a given plant k is the 
output rate q(k) at which 
VÔ x(w) J + 
b. The output rate q^(k). J. M. Clark (1923) seems to be the 
earliest economist to refer to this concept. But it got 
full treatment from J. M. Cassels (1937). 
c. The output rate q^(k). The first clear exposition is 
given by Hahn (1955). 
d. The point q2(k) at which average variable cost, i.e., 
v(x)•x(w)/q(w) reaches its minimum. Cassels considered it 
but only Eiteman (1947) strongly advocates it. 
e. From 8 , q(w) for a given k is a function of x(w), i.e., 
q(w) = q(x(w)). Let x(w) be considered the "normal operat­
ing conditions" for a firm of size k. Then q2(k) = q(x(w)) 
is perhaps closest to the concept of "practically attainable" 
capacity of a firm, which, once again, can be found in J. 
M. Clark, but seems to have been popularized by the Brookings 
Institution (Nourse, et al., 1934). 
A simple measure of x(w) would be the time average over L weeks, 
1 ^ i.e., x(w) =— Z q(w). More sophisticated ways of deriving x(w) would 
^ w=l 
be to take (i) the (ensemble) average of x(w) for different firms in 
the industry producing the same product with a given plant size or (ii) 
the weighted average of x(w) as in (i) but with different plant size 
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in a normal year, or (iii) some combination of ensemble and time 
average or (iv) some weighted average of the subjective estimates 
of experts about what is normal x(w). 
Since we are going to use a concept of capacity, which is, at 
least, as naive as q(k), we owe an explanation as to why the other 
concepts of capacity are not very useful, if we remove our simplifying 
assumptions. 
Under identical demand conditions, q(w) would tend to be equal 
to q^fw) and k to k^. Assuming no external effects, under perfectly 
atomistic competition, with free mobility of resources, k would also 
tend to k and q(w) to q (w) and E (w) would be equal to the price 
00 00 0 
of q(w). At this point q^(k) = qgfk) = q^^. 
If q (w) <q (w), then since all scale economies are not 
O 00 
realized (as it would be under perfectly competitive behavior of 
the firm), we can, at most, reach a second best, k would tend to 
become equal to k < k . But at k - k , q,(k) > q (k). But at 
^ o oo o 1 0 ' 
the point q(w) = q^(k), k = k^, cost can be reduced by building a 
more elaborate plant, namely F(q^). Hence, in the long-run, q^(k) 
cannot become the second best if q^(k) >q^(k). Only at k = k^ 
and q(w) = q^(k), is the cost minimizing proportions between k and x(q) 
reached. The above point was driven home by Harrod (1952), with 
the help of envelope cost functions. (J. M. Clark also recognized 
that it may pay to use a more expensive equipment, even if it cannot 
be kept busy all the time, if it results in big savings in direct 
costs, in preference to a small plant. But he did not see that 
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q(w) > q^(k) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a 
change of k.) 
does not have any normative significance unless we assume 
(as Eiteman does) that average variable cost declines continuously 
up to q(k) at which it is left continuous. But then qgfk) = q(k) = q^(k) 
(with a usual U-shaped average cost curve q2(k) < q^(k)). Moreover 
q2(k) is also (by Eiteman's definition) the output rate for which k 
is designed. 
Similarly q^^k) does not have any normative significance (for 
it is based on actual output rates) unless it serves as a good 
approximation for some other concept of capacity. Steindl (1952) took 
q2(k) as a good approximation for q^(k) which, we have shown, cannot 
serve as "second best" unless it is also "the best." 
Remove the assumption of "identical demand conditions." Since 
the optimum plant would now be designed for more than one output rate, 
it cannot be characterized by its size alone. We have also to 
characterize the optimum degree of flexibility property built into the 
plant . Evidently the plant designed under fluctuating demand conditions 
will be more flexible (or adaptable) than a plant designed under 
Identical demand conditions. 
There are two ways to get around the above difficulties. Instead 
of measuring capacity in terms of output, we may measure it in terms 
of input. We may assume that at any moment (the smallest unit of time) 
the plant generates a uniform and continuous flow of services whose 
dimension (as measured by a flow meter) is a unit of the service per 
moment. The capacity of the plant is total availability of its 
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services in a week. 
An alternative procedure would be to assume that for any plant, 
the operating cost (v(x)'x(w)) is proportional to q(w), for all 
q(w), 0 ^  q(w)< q. One possible situation when this can happen 
is when v(x) is independent of x(w) and x(w) is proportional to 
q(w), a product shadow. Sen and Sengupta (1969) have shown that 
if the firm has more than one plant of "equal efficiency" and if 
there are no interplant economies, then the ratio of variable costs 
to output will approach a constant asymptotically as the number 
of plants increases. This results from applying Joshep's (1938) 
theorem to a multiplant firm.^ 
The reasoning is simple. For each plant, there is an optimum 
proportioning of current inputs and the plant. If all the plant's 
average-cost curves are U-shaped then this point corresponds to 
the minimum point of this plant-average cost curve. Let the 
output that results at this point be called plant-capacity output. 
The capacity of the firm, q(w), is the number of plants times the 
plant-capacity. So long as q(w) is less than q(w), the optimum 
proportioning between current inputs and plants would be maintained 
by bringing more and more plants into use as output expands. 
It may be noted that even when such "physical divisibility" does 
not exist, the plant is perfectly segmentable on a time scale, if 
it generates a homogeneous flow of services at each moment. So 
an optimum proportioning between machine hours and current inputs 
can be maintained by keeping the plant idle if necessary. 
^For a more rigorous treatment, see Samuelson (1967). 
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Two objections might be raised: 
1. As the plant (or machine) is used over a continuous stretch 
of time its efficiency would be reduced. 
2. Plants installed at different dates (hence of different 
vintages) may require different amounts of current inputs 
per unit of output. 
Al. takes care of such possible objections. It may be mentioned 
that even if x(w) is not proportional to q(w), v(x)-x(w) can be 
proportional to q(w), if v(x) falls whenever x(w) rises more than 
proportionately to q(w), such that v(x)'x(w) remains a fixed propor­
tion of q(w). This can happen if the firm can put "monopsonistic" 
pressure on the factor markets from which x(w) are bought as x(w) 
gets larger or more simply, if the firm can get a "quantity discount" 
(i.e., a price discount when a larger quantity is bought). The latter 
situation arises whenever the production of x(w) is subject to 
economies of scale. 
Assuming that v(x)-x(w) is proportional to q(w), let us also 
assume that q is a strictly increasing function of k, the size of 
the plant. Moreover the constant factor of proportionality 
v(x)•x(w)/q(w) is assumed to be independent of k. Thus, we assume 
away the problem of the optimum proportioning of k and x(w) for a 
given rate of output (or a range of output). Since c(k) is a 
strictly increasing function of k, the only reason for building a 
larger plant would be to increase q(k). Hence, q(k) can be said to 
be equal to q^(k), in the sense that the size of the plant must be 
justified by how large a q(k) is planned for. Another way of 
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stating the same fact is > the marginal productivity of k is 
zero for all q(w) < q(k) and is only positive at q(w) = q(k). Lastly 
if a(w) > 0, q^(k) = q(k). Suppose the firm has more than one stock 
inputs, k^, k^, k^. For each stock input we associate q(kj), 
j=l, 2, m.^ Let u denote the proportionality factor, v(x)'x(w)/ 
q(w). Henceforth, we denote v(x)-x(w) = u-q(w) = V(w). 
We assume that not any two of stock-inputs are in substitution 
relationship to each other. Hence q(kj), j=l, 2, m and 
q(x) = are all limitational functions. Measuring each of these 
by their availability to the firm, the production function can be 
written as, 
q(w) = min (q(k^), qfk^), q(k^), 
Now V(w) = q(w)'u, hence, there cannot be any excess capacity with 
respect to current inputs. The same cannot be said of stock inputs. 
Hence, if for any j, q(kj) > q(w), there is an excess capacity of k^. 
Needless to say, this results from complete irreversibility 
of stock inputs, i.e., once they are purchased, they cannot be disposed 
of (or leased to other firms) at any positive price. 
While kj's cannot be sold in the market, they are subject to 
a constant rate of depreciation. But the rate of depreciation could 
be very low. 
We shall assume that it is perfectly possible to add to any k^. 
Since all variable costs are proportional to output, independently of 
^We assume that q(k.) is bounded at k =0, i.e., k is needed for 
producing q. J J 
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kj ' s, the capacity of any resource is additive, i.e., q(kj + Ak^) = 
q(kj) + q(Akj), for all j=l, 2, ..., m. 
If for any ky q(k^) = q(w), then that factor can also be 
called the minimum or limitative factor. If q(w) = q(kj) = q(k^); 
j ^  1, then both the resource and the 1^^ resource are limitational 
factors (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966). 
A growing firm, i.e., a firm for which q(w) is growing over time 
would ultimately adjust k^'s so that it is on its limitational line, 
i.e., q(w) = q(kj) for all j. 
The completely irreversible case is unrealistic, for in many realistic 
situations the capital goods can be sold at a positive price or they 
can be leased to others, if necessary. However, the selling price 
may be much lower than the purchasing price. Even disregarding the 
costs of disentangling the unused portion of an organic resource, there 
are installation costs or costs of assembling, etc. that cannot be 
covered. Lastly, for a growing firm, what is surplus capacity now may 
be required capacity later. 
We may now introduce the concepts of "fixed costs," "semi­
fixed costs" and variable costs for our one-product firm. Variable 
costs are associated with current inputs. They are proportional to 
output rates, whatever may be the level of stock inputs. We now 
introduce factor functions; k^ = k.(q(w)). k^ is the minimum level 
of stock input input) for producing q(w). Fixed costs are 
associated with fixed factors, i.e., factors for which k^, j=l, 2, 
..., m are either constants throughout or do not vary within a given range. 
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The semi-fixed costs are associated with semi-fixed factors for 
which kj = k_(q(w)) is a monotonically increasing function of q(w). 
For these factors, the factor functions can be inverted to obtain 
limitation functions, q(kj). 
Both fixed and semi-fixed factors are irreversible so that their 
rates of decrease are bounded below by their rates of depreciation. But 
they can be varied continuously both at the time of their installation 
and at the end of each week by building parallel facilities. 
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CHAPTER HI. MODELS OF OPTIMAL CAPACITY EXPANSION 
Single-Product Firm 
An analytical appraisal of some of the models of optimal capacity 
expansion policy for a single-product firm is attempted in this 
chapter. This analysis is intended to be illustrative rather than 
comprehensive. A more detailed treatment can be found in Sengupta 
and Sen (1969). 
It is assumed that only a single nonstorable output is produced. 
A demand function d(t) exists but the interpretation of this demand 
function is not the same in different models. 
The models are divided into two groups; 
1. capacity-expansion models with scalar optimization of 
the decision variables; 
2. capacity-expansion models using the functional equation 
approach of Bellman (1957) to determine the optimal 
intertemporal path. 
Chenery model (1952) 
The assumptions of the Chenery model are; 
1. d(t) is given such that its time derivative d(t) = g, 
where g is a constant (g > 0); 
2. all capital units are of constant efficiency type up to the 
end of the planning period, T(T < ™); 
3. demand at time 0, i.e., d^ =0. 
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The production function of the Chenery model can be written as: 
q = q(x, X, k^j) 
where q = the output produced, x = the physical dimension of variable 
costs (flow inputs), X, the number of capital inputs of divisible 
nature and denotes an indivisible factor where i * the physical 
size of the factor and j = the number of units of the factor; j can 
assume only integral (non-negative) values. 
From this production function (which is invariant over time and 
hence can be written without time subscripts), we can draw a series 
of cost curves. 
= the long-run cost function showing the minimum cost of 
producing any given q by varying x, X, i and j. (As there 
are economies of scale j=l, so long as we move on C^.) 
= intermediate cost curve, varying x and X, given i and j. 
C(i) = intertemporal cost curve showing the minimum cost of 
producing q, by varying x, X and j, given i. 
Plant curve = similar cost function by varying x alone, given 
X, i and j. 
Now, owing to the nature of the demand curve, profit maximization 
will require installation of the same size of plant as previously 
existing and at equally spaced time intervals. So the only relevant 
decision variable is the size of plant--which in turn will be uniquely 
related to the time interval between two subsequent installations. Since 
one C(i) corresponds to a given value of i, the objective of the entre­
preneur is to minimize total discounted cost with respect to i under 
the constraint of given output requirements. 
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In his more specific model, Chenery made the additional assumptions: 
Variable costs, i.e., cost associated with x can be ignored; 
X is assumed to be fixed (i.e., no process flexibility), so that 
C(i) would consist of a series of stair steps. Besides, 
the long-run cost function is specified by the relation 
= b s^ 
where a and b are constants, (b >0, 0 < ^ <1), and s = 
the scale of the plant of size i measured in terms of output. 
(This output is the same as capacity.) Maximum output of 
the plant is uniquely determined, for X is now fixed and j 
must be one since a <l--the only variable being x. 
Next, Chenery approximates the stair-step cost function C(i) as a 
linear function of s, i.e., by say: 
(12) = a^ + a^ s/2 + a^ tg 
where a^ = the portion of total cost that does not depend on output, and 
*1 = (Ci - *0)/:-
The minimizing condition for total discounted cost is then 
(13) + b(a-l) + a^ t/o^ = 0 
where cr is the scale of plant measured in "years" so that ag = s, g = 1. 
Assuming a^ and b are given constants, 13 gives a relation among 
r, T and ô, the optimum scale of plant. Of them the first three are 
parameters and the last one is the decision variable. Keeping any two 
of the parameters fixed, it is possible to show the parametric variation 
of Ô due to the change of any one of the three parameters. Specifically, 
it can be shown that & is a decreasing function of a , given r and T. 
35 
Since a lower value of a indicates greater economies of scale, Chenery' 
model provides theoretical support to the policy of building capacity 
ahead of demand when substantial economies of scale exists. Chenery 
has also shown that with process flexibility (i.e., when X is variable) 
the profitability of building capacity ahead of demand is increased 
and under fluctuating demand conditions the optimal capacity expansion 
policy will be biased in favor of over-expansion. 
Manne-Erlenkotter model (Manne, 1961; 1967) 
The assumptions of the model are; 
1. d(t) is growing at a constant annual rate g. Furthermore 
d^ = initial capacity; 
2. all capital units are of constant efficiency infinite-
durability type; 
3. the planning period is infinite; 
4. all operating costs are proportional to output; 
5. the C function (i.e., capacity-constfuction cost function) 
is stationary; 
6. there is a penalty (shortage) cost for the failure to meet 
d(t) and the rate of penalty cost is strictly proportional 
to the size of the backlog z, measured in years. 
The object of the enterpreneur is to minimize 
(14) C(a, z) [p z e dz + e C(a) j 
where p is the penalty cost per unit of backlog z and z is the optimum 
trigger level for backlog in demand, so that whenever z grows to z, a 
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facility is built. Both z and z are like a, expressed in years, so that 
zg = the amount of backlog that is permitted, both in terns of output. 
C(cr) is the construction cost of building a plant of scale c. The 
decision variables are cr and z. 
Erlenkotter has shown 
Rl. An admissible plant size a, must satisfy the following 
relation 
(15) C(a) 
t=0 
CO 
-rt 
^ pe dc = 22 
0 ° r 
If no value of a satisfies 15 , no plant will be built. ( A 
similar lower limit can be found for any nondecreasing demand function.) 
R2. For all admissible plant sizes 
(16) 2(a) = ï: a . 
pg 
Using these results and simplifying, it can be shown that an equivalent 
problem to 14 is to minimize 
-rz 
—  D  *  e  1 - 6  
(17) [a , z(a)] =^—2^ * 
r 1 - e 
Taking the log of 17 and differentiating with respect to a , and 
setting it to zero gives 
(18) ^ ^ = I£!X22 . 
e'? _ 1 P 
An important special case is when C(a) = ba , where as before b> 0 
and 0 < a <1. 
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The minimum admissible plant size will then be 
rb 
(19) min (k) = (—) 
The minimizing condition is 
(20) ^  = 0 
a(e" - 1) e"^ - 1 
I.e., 
(21)  
e - 1 e - 1 
If the penalty cost is very high (p <»), z drops out and 21 reduces 
to 
(22) a = . 
e - 1 
This is an alternative version of Chenery's specific model with an 
infinite planning horizon and continuous discounting. Since the 
planning period, T, is no longer a parameter, we are left with only 
two parameters, r and of. A higher r leads to lower â and a higher Q? to 
a higher â. 
An important feature of the Manne-Erlenkotter model is its regeneration 
point property--which states that between any two building dates there 
is a point at which demand equals capacity installed up to that point. 
In other words, no plant will be constructed when excess capacity exists. 
Besides from 19 it is evident that for all admissible plant sizes, the 
temporary phase for which demand is backlogged is less in duration than 
the number of years required for the growth of demand to equal the optimum 
scale of a plant. Thus, the assumption of finite penalty cost makes build­
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ing capacity ahead of demand profitable under more general cost conditions 
(i.e., concavity of need not be assumed) and at the same time stipulates 
the condition that demand will catch up to capacity before any further 
addition to capacity. 
Srinivasan's model (Manne, 1967) 
The assumptions of this model are similar to a continuous discount­
ing, infinite horizon version of Chenery model as described before. The 
only difference is in the nature of demand function--namely 
(1') d(t) grows at a constant geometric rate, so that 
= g' for all t. Besides as before d(0) = initial capacity. 
Srinivasan then establishes the resilt that it is optimal to construct 
plants at each point of a sequence of equally spaced time points, 
but now the size of plants to be constructed will grow exponentially. 
The decision variable is taken as t, the time interval between 
any two successive plant installations and the objective is to minimize 
(23) C(t) = Z e""^t b • jd(0)(eG't - 1) e"^'"} 
n=0 
Assuming r > g' and dropping the constant term an equivalent 
problem to (23) is to choose t to minimize 
(24) [eG'(C) _ if / [1 . e-(r-ag')t] 
The optimum t which can be shown to be unique is given by 
(25) -I) = hU - e'S't) 
where h = r - ag' > 0 by assumption. 
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It hardly needs mentioning that Srinivasan, like Chenery assumes 
that demand requirements must be met which is equivalent to assuming 
infinite penalty cost. 
All the above models employ classical optimization procedures to 
determine the structure of the optimum values. In the Chenery and Manne-
Erlenkotter models the optimum size of plant is the decision variable 
and since it is independent of the initial capacity, by applying 
renewal theory (or the idea of regeneration points) it can be shown that 
the same scale of plant will be built at equidistant time intervals. 
In Srinivasan's model the decision variable is the timing of installa­
tion of new plants and since in this model also the optimum size of 
plant is independent of initial capacity, the time phasing will be 
the same, though the size of plant will be growing. Besides either 
due to the concavity of the cost function, (Chenery, Srinivasan cases) 
or due to the assumption of finite penalty cost for backlogging (Manne-
Erlenkotter case) the optimum sequence of time points at which plants 
are added must be discrete, i.e., separated from one another by 
finite time interval. But in every case the optimum time interval 
has an upper limit, i.e., it is not profitable to build capacity 
infinitely ahead of demand. If the cost of construction of capacity 
is strictly proportional to incremental capacity and if the penalty 
cost is infinite, it would be always profitable to wait for demand to 
increase before any further addition to capacity and there would be 
continuous addition to capacity at the rate of increase of demand. 
40 
Capacity expansion models with optimal path approaches 
We shall now consider the capacity-expansion policy models which 
aim to develop algorithm for finding out the optimal path of capital 
expansion. We shall, however, discuss only the economic aspects of 
these models rather than their computational aspects. 
Arrow, Beckmann and Karlin model (Arrow, et al., 1958) 
The assumptions of this model are: 
1. d(t) is given as a function of time but its time rate of 
change d(t) is not constant; 
2. all capital units are of constant efficiency type with 
infinite durability. (Strictly speaking, they assume 
that maintenance costs are proportional to output.) 
3. y^, the maximum (capacity) output at t is uniquely deter-
4. Vj. = mq^ defined only for values of q^ ^ y^, m is a constant 
(m > 0) ; 
5. y^ = capacity at time t = 0. 
6. 0 ^  y(t) s: M for all t, where M is a given constant; (M < » ) 
and y(t) is the rate of change of capacity at t. 
Since capacity and cost are both additive we have 
r-t . 
mined by k^, the aggregate size of capital equipments at t. 
(26) y = y + y(T) dT and 
t O Jq 
,'T • _rt 
( 2 7 ) c  y ( t )  e  d t ,  w h e r e  c  i s  a  c o n s t a n t ,  ( c  > 0 )  a n d  C  
0 
is total discounted cost over the planning horizon. 
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In their system = min (d^, y^) is measured in units of net 
profitability. The object of the entrepreneur is to choose an optimum 
capacity schedule (y^, y^, y^) such that 
r-T 
[q e - c y e ^*"1 dt is maximized. 
0 ^ 
G = 
An equivalent way to write the objective function is 
(28) max min H(v, u) where 
V u 
H(v, u) = [d (1 - u(t)) + y u(t) - c y ] e dt 
0 
subject to the following constraints 
1. yj. ^ M 
2. 0 g u(t) ^  1. 
pT 
(29) Let 0 (t) = 
• t 
Then, the optimal capacity expansion policy would be 
- rT - T t 
u(T) e dT - c e , 
Rl. - 0 for all t, i.e., y(t) = y^ if rc - 1; 
R2. if 0 < rc < 1, the optimal path (0, T) can be divided into 
subintervals of the following types. 
a. 0(t)> 0; y^ = M, i.e., maximum expansion. 
b. 0(t) < 0; y^ = 0, i.e., no expansion. 
c. 0(t) = 0; y^ = so that y^ = d^ throughout this 
subinterval. 
The economic meaning of the results is when rc ^  1, the interest 
on the cost of expansion of capacity by one unit is as large as or 
greater than unit profitability. Hence, the condition Rl holds. U ( T )  
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will be one when demand exceeds capacity and zero when capacity expands 
r? 
demand. So the integral u(T) dT is a measure of the set of times 
t 
at which the firm will produce at capacity from t to T. Hence, the 
present value of returns from adding one more unit of capacity at t 
is given by the integral in 29 and its cost is ce . 0(t) is 
therefore the marginal profitability or the (discounted) profitability 
at t of adding a marginal unity to capacity. Hence 2a and 2c. Lastly, 
when 0<y^<M, u(t)=rc<l and y^=d^ and y^=d^ as in 2ci. 
In this model d(t) is given as a function of time but the optimum 
output program does not coincide with it. In other words the model 
allows for negative excess capacity in the sense that for some 
periods d(t) may exceed the output produced and there is no penalty 
cost associated with it. Besides, negative excess capacity may exist 
even when marginal profitability is positive, since it is impossible 
to add new capacity above a certain level. This restraint is similar 
to expansion cost associated with the first of the four factors in 
Baumol's model (1967). But here this expansion cost is infinite when y^=M 
and zero below that level. This restraint is necessary, for otherwise 
there would be an infinite expansion of capacity if marginal profit­
ability is positive. Since the cost function, C, is linear, there is 
no building ahead of demand. 
Since, in this model, output is measured in units of profitability, 
(i.e., net revenue), the existence of maintenance cost, proportional 
to output, does not make any difference. We have only to redefine unit 
of output so that it is also net of maintenance cost of capital per 
unit of output. So assumption 2 is not really necessary. We need only 
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to assume that the capital unit has no fixed lifetime and its service 
period can be extended up to the end of the planning period by incurring 
maintenance cost which is proportional to output, 
Manne-Veinott model (Manne, 1967) 
The assumptions of this model are: 
1. d(t) is given subject to the condition that d(t) ^  0 for all 
T-1 . 
t, up to T and Z d(t) > 0; 
t=0 
2. all capital equipments are of constant efficiency and 
infinite durability type; 
3. = c^y^ where is the cost of increment in capacity at 
t and y^ is the increment in capacity. This function is 
assumed to be concave for all t; 
4. y^ = d^, i.e., initial capacity is equal to initial demand; 
5. y^ > 0. 
Once again additivity of capacity, i.e., 26 holds. The objective of 
the firm is to find an optimal feasible capacity-expansion schedule 
defined by the vector y^ = (y^, y^, ..., y^ , to minimize 
T-1 . T-1 
(30) C([y ]) = Z c (y + Z p max (0, - z )) 
t=0 t=0 
where = the (temporary) penalty cost proportional to negative excess 
capacity. 
L e t b e  t h e  e n d  o f  p e r i o d  e x c e s s  c a p a c i t y  a t  t ,  i . e . ,  t h e  
difference between the cumulative values of y^ and d^. The feasibility 
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requirements on vector is given by ^ 0 and 0^ = 0. 
A point of regeneration of capacity expansion schedule y^ is said 
to occur at those points at which0^ = 0. It is then proved that 
there is an optimal capacity schedule which has the regeneration point 
property, as defined previously, and the schedule with that property 
can be searched efficiently with a dynamic programming recursion to 
find one that is optimal. 
In many respects the above model is a generalization of the Manne-
Erlenkotter model. While it generalizes the specific forms of demand 
and cost functions, it also arrives at less economically meaningful 
results. 
In recent years a number of capacity expansion policy models have 
appeared and it is not possible to give a comprehensive account of all 
these models. The purpose of several models not considered here is 
to extend the basic models presented in this paper to more general 
conditions and to undertake either a kind of sensitivity analysis 
to show the variations of the optimal plant size and its time phasing 
as one or another parameters is changed or to evolve a computing 
procedure to find the optimal capacity expansion path. Some of these 
extensions are quite straightforward. Thus, instead of a deterministic 
demand function, a probabilistic growth of demand function has been 
considered by Manne even in his 1961 article. The extensions do not 
alter the nature of optimal policies though they may require some 
additional condition. 
Another line that has been explored by Manne and his associates 
is the case of more than one producing area, instead of a single-producing 
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area. In this case, however, the extensions generally give less definite 
results and the computing procedure is only combinatorial, enumerative 
and less efficient. 
One usual feature of the manufacturing industries that is systematically 
ignored by the policy models considered here is the fact that very few 
firms produce a single output. Especially when extra capacity exists, 
it can be utilized by adding one more product to the list of products 
of the firm. 
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CHAPTER IV. . HICKSIAN MODEL OF A MULTI-PRODUCT FIRM 
In the Hicksian model of a multi-product and multi-factor firm, 
the factors are treated as negative outputs. Consequently there are 
no sign restrictions on the decision variables, q^, q^, ..., q^ which 
are related by a transformation function 
(31) f(qp qg, •. •, q^) =0. 
The transformation function (a scalar function of a vector, q = q^, 
q^, ..., q^l ) is assumed to be twice differentiable, i.e., possesses 
continuous first and second order partial derivatives. Moreover, 
both the prices of products and the factors (negative products) are 
parametrically given. No sales constraints or similar constraints 
on the availability of any factor is imposed. We shall also assume 
that there is a perfect market for all q^'s, in the sense of Chapter 
II. Hence, we do not have to make a distinction between the availability 
(or supply) and consumption of a factor. Moreover, all products are 
n 
sold. The net revenue that the firm maximizes is 2 p.q., where p. is 
th i=l ^ ^ ^ 
the price of i output. 
The problem before the firm (in vector notation) is 
max p'q = z subject to f(q) = 0 
where p = | p^, p^, ..., pj ; p^ > 0, i=l, 2, ..., n. 
Once an optimal q° is chosen we can distinguish between outputs 
and inputs, accordingly as q^ is positive or negative. It may be noted 
that for many firms output produced may also be used as inputs. So 
what is output and what is input is not known beforehand. 
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A few comments may be made about the transformation function. It 
has n-1 degrees of freedom in the sense that once n-1 of the q^'s are 
chosen the residual one can be read off from f(q) = 0. f(q) incorporates 
all technological knowledge so that given any combination of n-1 q^'s 
the rest is maximized algebraically. 
The maximizing output-input rates q° are given by 
(32a) =)i.f^ (i=l, 2, .n) 
(32b) f(q) = 0 
where p, is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with f; provided that 
f is quasi-concave (to be defined) not only at q° but at any q. Only in 
the latter case we can guarantee that q° is a global (rather than local) 
maximum. It may be noted that Hicks(1946) requires f to be unique 
only up to such monotonically increasing transformations for which the 
origin is a fixed point. Since any monotonie increasing function of 
a quasi-concave function is also quasi-concave, such a change of scale 
will preserve quasi-concavity. 
Quasi-concavity is familiar to the economists in the form of sign 
restrictions on the principal minors of the bordered Hessians of the 
function. One definition of quasi-concavity, without assuming 
differentiability, is that the function f(q) is quasi-concave if the set 
|q f(q) è Yj convex for any scalar y - Geometrically this means 
that in the n+1 dimensional vector space j^q, z j, if a hyperplane 
(n-dimensional) parallel to the q-plane is passed through the vertical 
z at Y , then the hypersphere f(q) lying above the hyperplane, projected 
on the q-plane would be a convex set. In the two-dimensional case any 
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elongated S-shaped curve which is convex in some part, concave in some 
part, but raonotonically increasing, is quasi-concave; on the other 
hand any U-shaped curve will not be quasi-concave since we can draw 
a line parallel to the x-axis and the portion of U lying above the 
line, when projected on the x-axis will be disconnected and hence not a 
convex set. 
Arrow and Enthoven (1961) have shown that if f has an increasing 
marginal rate of transformation when f >0 for i=l, 2, ..., n, between 
any pair of variables q^, q^, i^^j or between any two distinct composite 
variables, then f is quasi-concave. It may also be noted that if f is 
quasi-concave then for any set of prices, there would exist a global 
maximum that satisfy (32). 
Increasing marginal rate of transformation (remembering our 
sign conventions) imply: 
1. decreasing marginal rate of technical substitution between 
factors (i.e., for any i, j, i^j, such that q^, q^ < 0). 
2. decreasing marginal product for all factor-product combina­
tions, (i.e., for any i, j, i-'j, such that • q^ > 0). 
3. increasing marginal rate of product transformation, i.e., 
increasing marginal cost of one product in terms of another 
as the degree of assortment becomes biased in favor of the 
product, (i.e., for any i, j, i/j, such that q^, q^ >0). 
Similarly 32a implies: 
1. the price ratio of any two products must equal the marginal 
rate of product transformation between any products; 
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2. the price ratio of any two factors must equal the marginal 
rate of technical substitution between two products; 
3. the price ratio between a n y  factor-product combination must 
equal marginal product of the factor in terms of particular 
factor-product combination. 
To get economically meaningful results, Hicks also requires that 
f is not homogenous (of degree zero) in q^'s. He therefore suggested 
that there is some fixed production opportunity to which z is to be 
imputed. Since this production opportunity is fixed and not 
variable, it can be excluded from the transformation function, f, 
though its presence will determine the form of the function. 
Let us assume that the firm has some semi-fixed factors , k^, 
..., k^ which, in the given period are at the levels k^, k^, k^ and 
let us measure them with a positive sign. Incorporating them in the 
transformation function, the first problem in this chapter, becomes: 
n 
(33a) max Z p.q. = z 
i=l "• 
subject to 
(33b) F(q^, *^2' •••» 9^> ^1' ^ 2' ~ ^  
(33c) kj = kj j=l, 2, 3, m. 
Setting up the Lagrangian: 
n m _ 
(34) L = Z p q - M, F + Z X .(k - k ) 
i=l ^ j=l J J 
and differentiating L with respect to q^, q^ and k^, ..., k^ and 
setting them to zero, we get 
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(35a) Pj, = liF^; 1=1, 2, ..., n 
(35b) Xj = - ixF^; j=l, 2, m 
where indicates the partial derivative of F with respect to and 
Fj, its partial derivative with respect to k^. (Almost similar results 
are obtained by Nerlove (1958). ) 
By solving 35a, 35b and 33b, J3c j we obtain q?, (i=l, 2, 
..., m), and (j=l, 2, m) and k° (j=l, 2, ..., m). We 
assume that each ofi them is a continuous and differentiable function 
of (k^, kg, k^^in some neighborhood of an initial vector point 
k° = (k°, k°; k°). (Each of these functions has continuous 
partial derivative in each k^, j=l, 2, m). 
n 
Now z = Z p.q.. 
i=l "
Differentiating z with respect to k^, we get 
a z " (36) -2" = ^ p. , j-1, 2, . .., m . 
ôk. i=l ^ ôk, 
J J 
Similarly, differentiating 33b and 33c and remembering 
ôk, 
= 0 ;  j - 1  ( a s  t h e y  a r e  n o t  i n  s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  b y  
ôk^ 
definition), we get 
n . aq° ak° 
(37) Z f. ^  + b. = 0 j=l, 2, ..., m 
i=l ^ ôk. ^ ôk. 
J J 
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ôk° 
(38) 1 ^ = 0, j=l, 2, m. 
8k. 
J 
Multiply 37 by -p, and 38 by and add them to the left hand side 
of 36 . We get 
(39) -^ = Z (P: - • TT + 
ôk. 1=1 ôk. 
J J 
aq° 
-  I ^ F  .  -  X  .  
J 
ôk° 
+ X.. - 0 
ôk. J 
J 
j Ij 2j « * ; in» 
Hence, using 35a , 35b , we get 
(40) 4^ = j=l, 2, ..., m. 
J 
So X.'s can be given an economic interpretation. is the marginal 
revenue productivity of one more unit of k^, evaluated at k = k°. 
are also called the opportunity costs of the semi-fixed factors, kj's. 
Multiply X. by k. and summing over j's, we get, 
m m 
(41) I X  .k. = Z \ .k. (by (35c)) 
j=l J -> i=l J j 
= -ti Z F.k, (by (35b)). 
j=l J J 
From (33b); 
n m 
(42) E F.q° + Z F.k° = 0, 
i=l ^ ^ j=l J J 
up to first order approximation, since F is differentiable. 
Combining, we get, 
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m _ n 
(43) Z \.k = Z F.q° 
j=l ^ J i=l 
^ o 
= Z p.q. = z (by 35a ). 
i=l 1 
Hence, the total inputed value of the stock of semi-fixed resources 
is the same as total net revenue of the firm. 
Note that to derive 42 we did not assume homogeneity of F. If we 
want an approximation of a higher order, the homogeneity of F of any 
degree will suffice. 
Unfortunately, this is the furthest we can go with a Hicksian type 
transformation function. Equation 35b indicates the optimal value of X j 
but it involves (x which cannot be given any economic interpretation. 
In the usual single-product, multi-factor theory of a firm the 
associated Lagrange multiplier can be given an economic interpretation, 
namely that of marginal cost. Nerlove suggested one way of approach. 
He solves the transformation function explicitly in terras of a 
(numeraire) commodity. But this loses the symmetry of the problem. 
In the next section, we shall show how the separable convex 
programming approach effectively tackles the problem and expresses 
the opportunity cost of a semi-fixed resource in terms of the structural 
characteristics of the model, without being involved in an "undetermined 
multiplier" which cannot be given any economic meaning. 
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CHAPTER V. PROGRAMMING MODEL OF A MULTI-PRODUCT FIRM 
In a programming model, a criterion function, f, (usually a real-
valued function) defined on a convex set (usually a vector space) is 
optimized on a decision space (usually a manifold characterized by the 
nonnegativity of a vector function, g, on the same vector space). Further 
assumptions on the function f and the mapping g yield special types 
of programming, such as linear, quadratic, concave, etc. In the above 
sense, few optimizing models of a firm can escape from being pro­
gramming models. By a programming model of a multi-product firm, we, 
however, mean that type of model in which the concept of a "process" 
plays a central role. We, first of all, give a generalized version of 
a programming model. By making simplifying assumptions we then deduce 
as special cases some illustrative models of a multi-product firm 
and compare them with the Hicksian type models. 
We consider a model of production where N goods are "processed" 
with m factors of production. All factors are "stocks," i.e., they 
contribute to the production process by their mere presence. At 
any "moment" (the smallest unit of time) they generate a uniform 
and continuous flow of services whose dimension (as measured by 
a flow meter) is unit of the service per moment. They are not in 
substitution relationship, i.e., the service of one stock unit 
cannot be substituted for the service of another. (There may be 
more than one stock input of "equal efficiency.") b^ (j=l, 2, ..., m) 
is the "capacity" of the factor, i.e., the total availability of the 
services of the factor in a week, the operational period. It is equal 
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to the rate of flow (number of units of service per moment) multiplied 
by the number of moments in a week, and hence has the dimensionality 
of unit per week (unit/moment x moment/week). 
The flow of services from any factor is considered "free" up 
to its limits of availability, b^. It may be possible to impute 
"price" with the service of the factor (and on that basis, "rental" 
per unit of the factor). But it is not market price (or rental since 
the possibility of leasing the factor to outside or hiring it from 
outside does not exist within a week) and it does not appear in the 
objective function. In the latter part of this chapter, the above 
"irreversibility" assumption with respect to factors would be relaxed. 
To concentrate on the production aspect of the firm, we assume 
that all the goods have a "perfect" market as defined before. 
There are r processes, each indexed by k. The intensity of the k ^  
process is indicated by x^. It is measured by an ordinal scale, 
unique only up to strictly increasing monotonie transformation with 
origin set at the zero level of intensity, can only take nonnegative 
values, i.e., each process is irreversible. 
An activity x is an r-dimensional vector, belonging to R^, the 
(cartesian) product set of r copies of R, the set of real numbers. 
The k^^ element of x is x^, the intensity of the k'^ process, i.e., x = 
x^, ..., x^J" . X denotes the set of all activities, i.e., 
that subset of the nonnegative orthant of R^, to which x must belong. 
Define m + N scalar (single-valued) functions: 
f.; X->R; i e I^ 
g : X^R; j G I^ 
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where is the index set of positive integers of dimensionality n. 
For any x e X, and for a given i e I^, f^(x), if positive, uniquely 
determines the amount of the i^^ good (output) produced by the activity x, 
if negative, the amount of the i*"^ good (input) consumed by the activity 
X, all measured per week. There is a market price, p^ >0, for each 
i^^ good, ie I^, at which the firm can either purchase or sell any 
amount it likes of the i*"^ good, without any sales constraint or any 
limit on its availability. We assume that all outputs are sold and 
and all inputs are purchased in the right amounts. In a "perfect 
market" this "no inventory" assumption does not result in any loss 
of generality as the "net worth" of the firm would remain the same 
anyway. The dimension of p^ is dollar per unit of the i^^ good, i e I^, 
The net revenue from x (or more strictly speaking, the aggregated 
quasi-rents of the capital outfit, b^, b^, ..., b^) is 
n 
Z p.f.(x) = p'f(x) 
i=l ^ 
where p = ^p^, p^, ..., p^j; f(x) ={f^(x), f^^x), •••, (^(x)} . 
Similarly for all x e X, and j e I^, §j(x) uniquely determines the 
rate of flow of service from the factor multiplied by the moments 
per week, the factor is utilized by the activity vector x. Its 
dimension is unit per week (unit/moment x moment/week). 
The problem before the firm is 
(1.1) max p'f(x) = z 
X e X 
(1.2) subject to g(x) ^  b 
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where g(x) ={g^(x), ggtx), g^(x]^ and b ={b^, b^, ..., b^ j. 
Equation (I.l) indicates that the i*'^ good, i e 1^, contributes to 
"net revenue" at the rate p^. Since the price vector, p, is positive, 
Pifi(x) is positive, if f^(x) is positive, i.e., if the i*"^ good is an 
output and p^f^(x) is negative, if f\(x) is negative, i.e., if the i*"^ 
is an input. The relation (1.2) indicates that for a particular x 
chosen that kind of perfect balancing may not be achieved so that all 
the factors are utilized up to their capacities. Hence, excess 
capacity (rate of flow x idle time) might exist for a particular 
factor. Its dimension is also unit of the service per week. Further­
more, such excess capacity is "costless," a consequence of irreversi­
bility of the factor supplies, z is a scalar and is measured in 
dollars per week. We introduce the following assumptions: 
AA.l f\(x) is process-wise separable, i e I^, i.e., 
k=l 
AA.2 gj(x) is process-wise separable, j g I^, i.e.. 
AA.3 X is the nonnegative orthant of 
AA.4 For each process k, k e I^, there is at most one i, 
i e I , for which f. > 0. 
N ik 
AA.5 AA.l holds and f(x) = where 
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B = 
^11 ^12 
^21 ^22 
Ir 
2r 
AA.6 
\2 ••• \r I 
AA.2 holds and g(x) = Ax where 
^11 ^12 ••• ^Ir \ 
A = 
^21 ^22 '•• ^2r 
a T a ... a 
ml m2 mr / 
AA.l and AA.2 imply that the effects of different processes k e are 
distinguishable. The processes do not support or impede one another, however, 
they are not completely independent because they share the services of an 
inelastically given supply of factors with fixed capacity limits, b. 
It may be noted that AA.2 does not necessarily mean that the factors 
are physically divisible among the process, without any loss of 
efficiency. Even when the factor is physically indivisible and immobile, 
its flow of service may be divisible (allocable) among the processes 
by time segmentation. Separability is the obverse side of additivity. 
Hence, AA.l implies that the total amount of the i ^ good, i g 1^^, 
produced by the activity vector x, is the algebraic sum of the amounts 
produced by the r processes at the indicated level of intensities, x^, 
k e I^. Similarly AA.2 implies that the total amount of the service 
capacity of factor, j e utilized by the activity vector, x, 
is the sum of the consumption riites of its service by each of the r 
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processes at the indicated level of intensities. AA.3 implies that 
each process can either be used to any positive extent or not used 
at all, i.e., an entire half-line (0,°=) belongs to each process. 
By AA.3, each process inherits the "perfect divisibility" property 
of real half-line. AA.4 implies there is no joint production of 
more than one output by the same process, k, k e AA.5 implies 
constant coefficients of production or consumption of each 1^^ good, 
i e by each process. AA.6 implies that the technical rates of 
utilization of the service of each factor, j e are fixed 
for each k^^ process, k e 
We now consider (1) a concave programming problem, (2) a separable 
concave programming problem, and (3) a linear programming problem--
in the context of a multi-product firm. Since we are interested in 
economic implication, we may make a "stronger" (but economically 
meaningful) assumption than what is necessary to guarantee the results. 
Concave-programming problem 
We assume AA.3 holds. The problem I becomes, 
N 
max 2 p.f.(x) 
i=l ^ 
(II) 
subject to g (x) ^ b , j e I ; x ^ 0, kg I 
J J m K. r 
We assume 
1. f^(x) is a concave and differentiable function of x, x e X, 
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2. gj(x) is a convex and differentiable function of x, x e x, 
i ' Im-
N 
Define F(x) = I p.f.(x). Since p. s 0, F(x) will also be a concave 
i-1 ^ ^  ^ 
and differentiable function in x. Since stocks are measured with 
positive sign, b^O. Let us assume that b > 0, and g(0) = 0, where 0 
is the null vector, i.e., 0 e R^. (At the zero level of activity no 
factor of production is utilized.) 
Hence, the problem II satisfies Slater's condition (1951), 
since 0 e X and b - g(0) > 0. Suppose an optimal x° exists for a 
given b°. Then z(b°) is finite. It can be shown that at b = b°, the 
following right-hand and left-hand derivatives will exist (Uzawa, 1958; 
Balinsky and Baumol, 1968). 
f z(b° + Ab .e ) - z(b°) 
^— 
z(b°+ Ab.e.) - z(b°) 
Ab. 
np. u - I 
J 
where is the elementary vector, 
is the forward marginal revenue productivity and(^-ôb 
j 
is the backward marginal revenue productivity of the factor, j e I , 
evaluated at b = b 
m 
o 
Moreover, x° is optimal if and only if there exists a vector y° = 
y°, y° ..., y°j" such that the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold, 
^( )° implies that the partial derivatives are evaluated at x=x°. 
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with equality for such k for which is positive, i.e. a scope for 
reducing further exists. 
g.(x°) s b., j e 
with equality for such j for which > 0. 
Lastly, y°, je is an upper bound of forward marginal productivity 
a n d  a  l o w e r  b o u n d  o f  b a c k w a r d  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  j f a c t o r ,  j  e  
(&)+ " 'j %)' j « 
with equality replacing inequalities where the left-hand and right-hand 
derivatives are equal at b = b°. 
Separable concave programminR model 
We assume AA.l, AA.2 and AA.3 hold. 
N 
Deinfe = Z Pi£ik<\>' I' -
1=1 
fk<\' = \  
The problem I becomes 
(III) max Z F.(x ) 
k=l ^  ^ 
r 
subject to Z g..(x.) ^  b j e I 
X s 0, k e I 
k r 
Assumptions 1 and 2 of problem II are replaced by: 
3. F^(x^) is a concave and differentiable function of x^, k e I^; 
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4. is a convex and differentlable function of j e 
I , k e I . 
m r 
We further assume (as before) b > 0 and gjj^(O) = 0, j e k e 
For a given b = b° > 0, an optimum x° ^  0 exists if and only if, 
there exists an y° ^  0, such that 
and the equality holding for such k for which x^ > 0 
' 'j' ^  
with the equality for such j, for which y° > 0. 
y°, once again will be an upper bound of marginal revenue productivity of 
the jresource in the forward direction and a lower bound of the 
same in the backward direction. It may now be interpreted also as "effi­
ciency" price associated with the constraint at which a transfer of the 
factor as between different processes should take place so that the 
best "use" is attained for this factor relative to all opportunities 
and all constraints in the system. 
To illustrate this property of y", we create the "fiction" of 
a divisionalized firm. Each division is assigned one process. Besides 
these r divisions, there is a central division, the custodian of all 
m factors from which the different divisions requisition their require­
ments, The manager ot the division is asked to requisition g^j^[xj^(t) ], 
j e I , k ç I , where x,(t) is chosen to maximize 
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yj(t) is the "provisional" price of the service of the factor, j e 
charged by the central division at t*"^ iteration. For each y(t) = 
ygft), •••» y^ft)}, the corresponding x^(t) =x^[y(t)] is 
determined. To justify his existence the manager maintains zero-profit 
intensity of the process at a constant level, but increases the intensity 
of the process if it is profitable, and decreases the intensity of the 
process if it is unprofitable unless = 0 already. Once the requisitions 
are made, prices are revised by the following rule (Whinston, 1964). 
dr 
dy.(t) I 0 if yj(t) = 0 and |b^ - Z > 0 
L otherwise. 
where L is a positive constant. In other words, the price is raised if the 
resource is in excess demand, lowered (unless it is zero already) if in 
o dy (t) 
excess supply. When "efficiency" prices y is established, —^— = 0, 
for each j e I^, and x° R(x°) =0, i.e., if x° is positive, n(x°) = 0. 
So the requisition orders are not changed. The central division, then 
and only then, allocates to each division, ^ ^ k e 
and absorbs any surplus that is not allocated. Such a process of 
allocation is called "fiction" for most of the fixed and semi-fixed 
resources are not like "spare parts" which can be requisitioned from 
the center but "immobile." The possibility of transferring units of 
such a factor from one process to another still exists since men and 
materials appropriate to one process can be moved more easily. If the 
mountain does not come to Mohammed, Mohammed would go to the mountain. 
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However, such a switching of one resource from one process to another 
might give rise to "relocation cost" as in Pfouts'(1961) and Dhrymes' 
(1964) models. 
It may be noted that F^(0) = 0, k e I^. So no process will be 
operated at a positive level unless F^^x°) ^  0. But since n(x°) = 0, 
for > 0, F^(x°) = 0 with x° > 0, only if ~ 0 for each j e I 
i.e., the process does not require any of the factors, even when 
operated at a positive level. If we exclude that case > 0, 
if x° >0. F(x°) is the contribution of each process towards net 
revenue, i.e., net revenue is process wise separable. 
Linear programming problem 
We now assume AA.3, AA.5, and XX.6 hold, 
W ' ° "k- k : Ir-
1 = 1 
If the process intensity is measured by a scale unique up to linear 
transformation for cach k c I^, then a further simplication is possibl 
by setting the origin at the zero level of intensity, as before, and 
choosing the unit of the k^^ process in such a way that c^l,(k e I^). 
(The dimension of is dollar per unit of intensity of k^^ process). 
We shall, however, not make such a simplification. 
The problem before the firm is 
max c'X = p'Bx 
(IV) subject to Ax ^  b 
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where c {^ 1' ^ 2'  
We now assume that b ^ 0, A S 0, and some a^^ is positive for each 
k e Then an optimal x° must exist. 
Proof : The set | x | Ax ^  b, x ^  oj- is not empty as 0 is a point 
in the set. Write the dual to (IV) 
min b'y 
subject to yA' ^  c' 
y s 0 • 
By choosing y as large as necessary (e.g., y.-max(0, —) it can be shown 
J k jk 
'' 1 1 o 
that j^y I yA' s c', y ^  Oj is not empty. Hence, an optimal x ^ 0 and 
corresponding y° ^  0 exist such that 
C - y°'A 3 0 
with equality for such x° that x° > 0, k e 
o 
Ax s b 
with equality for such y°, that y° > 0, j e I -
n V J y ^ j ' m 
Moreover, for any b ^ 0, z(b) will be a concave, piece-wise linear function 
in b. Its partial derivatives where they exist, e.g., are equal 
to y°, j e I^. Where they do not exist, 
, Oz , O /'Ô Z \ 
V+ ^  ^ Vôb .)-
J J 
since the left-hand and right-hand derivatives will always exist. At 
the optimal x°, the y° vector can be used to calculate the imputed cost 
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th 
of k process, 
\ " "kl^ l + ^ 2^ 2 + • • • • Vm-
If < Cj^, the k*"^ process will not be utilized and is the 
cost of introducing the k*"^ process at the unit level evaluated at 
z(b) = b'y° = c'x°. Besides only those processes would be utilized 
for which z, = c, . 
k k 
So far we have made no distinction between input and output. 
This is not mere fancy. When the processes are essentially inter­
dependent (i.e., not separable) some good may be an output for a firm 
at a particular value of x and input for some other value of x, the 
activity vector. (For a farmer, seeds may be sold at a low intensity 
of farming and purchased from the market at a high intensity of 
farming.) 
When the processes are separable, we only require to know what is 
input and output for a particular process. Even then for a nonlinear 
2 
process there is one difficulty. Let f ^^(x^) = a^(x^ - x^), where 
a, > 0 . Then by our sign convention, the i*"^ good is an output for 
0 < x^ < 1 and input for x^ > 1 for the process! Perhaps this can 
be avoided by defining an "economic region" for a particular process. 
We shall however, make the following assumption: 
AA. 7 AA. 1 holds, f ^^(x^) = 0 at x^ = 0 and f^ is monotonie 
in X, for all i e I , and k e I . 
k N r 
It is easy to see that for any particular process, k, inputs and 
outputs are unambiguously determined, if AA.7 holds, by their signs 
at any x^ > 0, unless f^^(x^) = 0. Moreover, in the linear case, AA. 7 
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is trivially satisfied. 
Let AA.2, AA.3, AA.4 and AA.7 hold. We also omit from the list 
of processes those for which f^(x^) 0 for any i e and for any 
value of > 0. Such a process can never contribute towards net 
revenue. By AA.4, f^(x^) > 0 for at most one i. Let n be the number 
of processes for which f^(Xj^) > 0 for some value of > 0. We 
renumber the processes so that i^^ good is produced by the i^^ process. 
If the same good is produced by two different processes they are 
considered as separate goods. 
Define = f^(x^) , i e I^. Let us choose as the index of 
intensity of the i^^ process. We also assume that none of the i^^ good, 
i s is being consumed by any process, i e So there are 
outputs, and there are current inputs which are purchased from the 
market. Let the index of all current inputs be j, j=m+l, nri-2, ..., 
M, and gj^(q^) is the amount of the current input consumed for 
producing q^, j=iiri-l, m+2, M. 
Define v . = g..(q.), i e , i e I . The production function 
ml ji 1 M n 
of q., i e I can be written as 
1 n 
" i  =  ' 2 1 '  • • • •  V -
Thus, the "process" in programming literature looks similar to a 
"production function" in neoclassical literature. But the similarity 
is only apparent. All the arguments in the function are parametrized 
by q^, i.e., all the factors are product shadows. So we have only one 
degree of freedom. As soon as 4^ is chosen all v^^, j i: are deter­
mined. However, when the same good is produced by more than one process, 
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we have more than one degree of freedom to obtain a given level of output. 
By taking convex combinations of the processes we can produce the same 
level of output by alternative factor combinations. But continuous 
factor substitutions would not be possible even in this case. Only 
in the case of infinite processes we have Vj^, j e i e as all 
independent decision variables. The optimizing conditions would then 
be different. 
To bring out this difference let us relax the assumptions of (1) 
irreversibility of durable inputs, and (2) no limit on the availability 
of the current inputs. We assume that the firm starts with a given 
supply of current inputs, b^ is the availability of the current input 
to the firm in the week, j = m+1, m+2, ..., M. Let w^ be the price 
at which the firm can sell the factor. For j=l, 2, ..., m, w^ is the 
rental obtained by the firm by leasing one unit of service of the 
factor to the outsiders. For j=m-l-l, ..., M, is the price at which 
the market would take the current input. We shall assume that b^, 
j=l, 2, ..,, M is given, i.e., it is not possible to augment the supply 
of the factor by either outright purchase, j=m4-l, ..., M, or by hir­
ing the service of the factor, j=l, 2, ..., m, from the market, 
Wj can be given an alternative interpretation. Let us assume that at 
the beginning of the week all resources are with the central division. 
The cost of transferring any factor to all product divisions is 
the same. Then w^ is the cost of allocating the factor to a product 
division, that could be saved by the firm by no such allocation. We 
assume w. ^ 0. 
J 
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We now define a selling activity. Let be the amount of the 
factor, j, that is sold in the market at Wj, je I^. The programming 
problem before the firm is 
n M 
max 2c.q. + Z w.q . = z 
^1' ^2' •••' ^ n4N i=l ^ ^  j=l j 
(V) subject to Z g..(q.) + q . ^  b , j=l, 2, M 
J J J 
q^ s 0, i=l, 2 ,  . . . ,  n+M. 
We assume 
1. gj^(q^) is a convex and differentiable function of q^, i e 
j G^N-
2. bj > 0, and g (0) = 0, j e i e 
The above is a separable concave programming problem, which satisfies 
Slater's condition at q^ = 0, i e Hence, for a given b = b^, 
j" ) b > 0, an optimum q° ^  0 exists, if and only if, there exists 
an y° ^  0, such that, 
(44) c^ — Z y. J ^ 0, i-1, 2, n 
j=l i 
and the equality holds for such i, for which q? > 0; 
(45) w^ - y° 0, j=l, 2, . .., M 
and the equality holds for such j for which q°^^ > 0 
n 
(46) z g..(q°) + q° . ^  b , j=l, 2, .... M 
and the equality holds for such j, for which y° > 0. 
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From 44, 45 and 46 we obtain 
n n M / 8g. 0 
" 1=1 
A"iVj '  A'j 
M n M M 
jfi ='j + b.,° 
The new element is relation 45 - It shows that the imputed price 
y° for any resource cannot fall below w^, for any factor. Moreover, 
if Wj >0, y° >0 and we have from 46, 
" "j 
i.e., the available supply of resources will either be used in production, 
or be sold (or leased) at a positive price if such a possibility exists. 
Similarly from 45, w. = y°, for any resource sold (or leased) outside. 
Using 48 and 49, z can be expressed as 
n M M n 
Let us make the usual assumptions, namely, 
1. unrestricted in sign for j=m+l, m+2, ..., M, i.e., 
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m. 
current inputs can either be purchased or sold at a given 
price Wj > 0, j=nH-l, ..., M. 
2. Wj = 0 for j=l, 2, .m, i.e., durable capital goods cannot 
be leased to outside. Hence, = 0 for j=l, 2, . 
Now 45 should be replaced by 
(45') w^ = y°y j=nri-l, m+2, ..., M 
y° > 0, j=l, 2, ,.., m. 
And from 46 
m n m 
(50) S Z g..(q°) y° = z b y°. 
j=l i=l ^ ^ j=l 
Using 50, z can be written as 
M n f M 
z = 
j=nri-l i=l ' " " j=m+-l 
The first term is the net worth of the firm at the beginning of the week 
and the second term is the net value added by production within the week. 
It may be noted 45' implies that for any current input the marginal 
revenue productivity is equal to its price for all j. 
Let us now compare the above model with a model of multi-product 
firm in which the "production function" replaces the process. 
The problem before the firm is 
n n M 
max Zc.q. - Z Zw.v.. 
i=l ^ ^ i=l j=l ^ ^^ 
subject to q^ - q^(v^^, v^^, ..., v^^^) = 0, i=l, 2, ..., n 
n 
Z v .. - b ,, i=l, 2, . .., m. 
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where ^0, i e ^ 0, je i e The Lagrangian would 
be 
n n M 
L = Z c . q .  -  S  Z w . v . . +  Z X . [ q .  -  q ^v.)] +  
i=i ^ ' i=i j=i : i=i 1 1 ^ ' 
where ..., . It may be noted that j=l, 
2, ..., m, now should be interpreted as allocation cost of the 
resource to the i*"^ production division. If an optimum q°, v°, v^, 
v°, exist then there would exist ?*.?, i=l, 2, n and (i?, j=l, 2, 
m, such that, 
(51) c^ ^  •••' " 
with equality for those i, for which q° > 0 
Sq 
(52) "ji - -57: - s ° 
with equality for those (ji) for which > 0 
(53) q^ - q^(v^) = 0 
n 
(54) b.- Zv..^O 
J i=i 
with equality for those j, for which > 0. 
^ 0 ; y j is unrestricted in sign, j=l, 2, m. 
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Such differences appear because now the decision variables are 
n + nM, though they are related by n production relations and m 
inequalities. We have thus more degrees of freedom. 
The above discussion of programming type models is not intended 
to be a survey of existing models of multi-product firms. By con­
centrating on "production aspects" of a multi-product firm, we have 
ignored quadratic-programming type models (e.g., Dorfman's models, 1951) 
or other types of models in which price is not assumed to be given 
and selling is considered a separate activity (Parrel, 1954; Brems, 
1961), Moreover, it ignores stochastic considerations (Dhrymes, 
1964). Our purpose has been to present a variety of programming 
models to indicate what we gain or lose by alternative sets of 
assumptions. 
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CHAPTER VI. THE MODEL 
We now formulate a simple model of a multi-product firm, which we 
hope, would be regarded as more suitable for explicit dynamization than 
the existing models of multi-product firm. Much of the development 
would be straightforward in view of the related discussion of one-
product firms in the first two chapters. 
We adopt the following conventions: 
1. products will be indexed by i; 
2. resources will be indexed by j; 
3. inputs are measured with positive sign. So costs also 
appear with positive signs. 
Consider a firm producing n number of products, q^, q^, q^. 
For each product there is a sales limit d., i e I , up to which the 
i n 
firm can dispose of any amount that it is willing to produce at a given 
(gross) market price, p^. Anything produced over the sales limit cannot 
be sold in the market. The price functions, and the corresponding 
revenue functions, are given by; 
(55) P.(q.) = p.; 0 < q^ 5 d^ 
(56) R_(q.) = p.(q.). q. = p^q.; 0 < q. ^  d^ 
- Pjd.; q. i d. 
i e I . 
n 
We shall make the "no inventory" assumption. All outputs are sold. 
Moreover, the firm will not produce anything that cannot be marketed. 
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So is also the amount sold of the i^^ good, i e As a consequence 
the amount produced of the good would be subject to the following 
constraints 
(57) 0 s q. 3 d., i G -
There are two types of cost associated with producing and marketing 
any commodity. In the first place, there is variable cost, V^, 
associated with producing the i^^ commodity which is assumed to be 
proportional to the amount produced, q^: 
(58) V^(q^) = u^q^; q^ s 0, u^ > 0, i g 
Economically speaking, u^, the constant of proportionality, is 
the marginal as well as the average variable cost for the i^^ product, 
i e I . 
n 
As regards the marketing cost, we shall make a slight departure 
from Chapter I, We assume that the marketing cost associated with the sell­
ing of the i'"" commodity is given by the following quadratic function, 
2 
(59) M.(q.,d.) = m., 
I d. 
where 
0 ^  qi ^  ^ i' *il' ™i2 >0' iE 
If we make m^^ = ^^^2' get the marketing cost function that we 
obtained in Chapter I, However, Equation 59 does not result in any 
additional complications and there is no reason why the cost of 
marketing (for a given d^) proportional to the amount sold q^ < d^, 
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2 
and the cost of marketing proportional to should have the same 
constant of proportionality. 
Differentiating d^) partially with respect to and d^ 
and differentiating them again with respect to q., we get 
(60a) "i' , o s , . < d . . l e I „  
1 1 d. 
1 
(60b) -y .y, 0^<,.<d., i= 
1 d. d. 
1 1 
, d ) m 
(6%:) ' ^ =-4r , 0 <q. <d., i 
a q ^  
^ ^ 0 s ,. < d., i e . 
11 d. d. 
1 1 
The above relations indicate that the marketing cost is a convex 
and increasing function of q^, and hence, the marginal market­
ing cost is also an increasing function of q^, q^ < d^. 
Both marketing cost and marginal marketing cost are reduced with an 
increase in d^, q^ being evaluated at a point where q^ < d^. 
Subtracting 58 and 59 from 56 for each ig and summing 
over i, we get the objective function of the firm 
0 <  q . <  i s  1 ^ .  
In 61 we are, in effect, assuming (in addition to the assumptions 
that are stated explicitly before) that marketing costs are separable 
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for each product and they are additive. Of course, this does some 
violence to reality. 
a. In the first place, all products (or at least some) might 
be sold through the same sales organization set up by 
the firm. 
b. The familiarity of the consumers with one product of the 
firm might create good will and hence push the sales limit 
for the other products of the firm, hence, reduce marketing 
costs by 60b. 
c. Most buyers like to purchase from the same spot, due to 
inertia. 
As against a, b and c which might create complimentarity of marketing 
costs of different products, we have to consider that a multi-product 
firm generally chooses those products which are technically complementary 
(i.e., lies within its technical horizon) and hence competitive in 
demand. These two opposing forces may neutralize each other. 
There are two types of constraints, subject to which the objective 
function in 61 would be maximized by the firm for a given period. 
In the first place, there are the sales constraints, already incorporated 
in our model by 57 . In addition to them there are the "capacity" 
constraints. We start with defining capacity as in the last chapter, 
namely, by, j e I^, is the total availability of service flow from the j*" 
resource in a given production period. Later we show how these input 
capacities give rise to some "conditional" supply restraints for the 
production of any commodity, given the production levels of other 
commodities. 
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We assume that each product is produced by only one process and 
each process produces only one product, i.e., no joint production 
is allowed. The processes are indexed by the product index and the 
intensity of the process is measured by the output produced. Let 
gj^(qi) be the scalar function that indicates the consumption rate of the 
productive service by the i^^ process, when the process intensity 
is q^, i e I^, j e gj^(q^) can also be thought as the "factor 
function" i.e., the minimum amount of the productive services of the 
factor that is needed for producing the i^^ good. We assume that g^^Cq^) 
IS a convex. differentiable function of q^ and gj^(O) = 0, ^ 0, 
q^ ^  0, i e j e As a result gj^(q^) would be monotonically 
increasing in q^, i e j e I^. 
Given the supply of m productive resources, b^, b^, ..., b^, the 
production possibility set for the firm in the given production period 
is given by: 
(62) S s b.. j e I„ G-i 2 0. 1 e 
Combining 61 and 62 we get the following programming problem for 
the firm in a given production period, 
2 
n 
max ^ 
(P) 9]^ I ^2' • • ' ' i=l 
"•ii^ i 1 
m. 
Pi^i " "i^i " d. 2 "i2 , 
1 d 1 
subject to z g..(q.) ^  b j=l, 
i=l ^ j 
2, 
0 s; q^ ^ d^, i=l, 2, . . ., m 
"'il 
Define c. = p. - u. - -—, i e I 
1 1 1 d. n 
1 
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1 
q = {q^, qg, qj 
^ " {^1' ^ 2' ••*' ^n} 
, r. , , 1 ,. r ""12 "22 "32 %2i 
^ l 1' ^ 2' • • • ' n J ' ^^^4. ~2~'  ~2~' • " ' "yj 
''1 ''2 ''3 "n 
The programming problem P can be written as 
m a x  ,  l u ,  
m  ^  c  q  -  2  q  M q  
n 
subject to 2 g..(q.) <: b j e I 0 <; q ^  d . 
i = l J 
We assume d > 0. Then M is defined and it is positive definite. 
Hence, the objective function is strictly concave. It is maximized 
subject to constraints which are convex and separable. So P is a 
separable concave programming problem, since the objective function 
is also separable. Let us assume that b. > 0, je I . Then the 
] m 
feasible set is non-empty and satisfies the Slater's condition at 
q=0, since g..(0) =0, ieljjel. Moreover, it is bounded, 
J i n m 
because of the sales and nonnegativity restraints. Hence, an optimum 
q° exists and it is unique. Any strictly concave function has 
a maximum in a closed convex set and it is unique. Hence an optimal 
y°, exists so that the necessary and sufficient Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions will hold. 
m m q. m /Bg. _ o 
1 d. j=l 
with equality for those i, for which q^ > 0 
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(63b) b - 2 g (q ) a 0, j G I 
J J-L J-
with equality for those j, for which y° > 0 
(63c) d. - q. s 0, i e I 
1 i n 
with equality for those i, for which w° > 0 
(63d) y° > 0, w° 2 0 
,  o f o o  o l o f o o  o \  
where y = ^  y^, yg ), w = \w^, Wg' "nJ ' 
It may be noted that b^ is the total availability of the flow of services 
from the resource in the given production period, while g^^, for 
a given j and i, indicates the total use made of the resource, or the 
amount of productive services of the resource consumed, in the production 
of the i^^ good. Let v.. =g..(q.), iel , j el . Then v.. is the ji ]i n m ji 
amount of the productive service consumed in producing q^ . 
Ignoring the current inputs (i.e., assuming they are purchased as 
they are needed in sufficient quantity), the production function 
for i^^ good, in the "classical" sense is 
(64) q. = q.tvi., Vgi v,,.), i G 
This is a parametric production function. Once q^ is determined 
^ij' ^ G I^ are all determined. So it appears that we have one degree 
of freedom. We now follow an alternative route. Let there be a 
decomposition of the resource vector b = b^, b^, ..., b^ into m n 
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sets of real numbers, , which satisfy the following conditions; 
(65a) +  ••• +  ^ 
( 6 5 b )  b . .  >  0 ,  i  €  j  e  
Once again, such a decomposition can be illustrated with the 
"fiction" of a divisionalized firm, where each division produces one 
product. Given the capital outfit, b^ ~ ^2i' *'*' '^mil 
i*"^ division, there is a reasonable way of defining output capacity 
of this capital outfit. 
For any given j and i, function can have one of the following 
properties : 
1. strictly increasing in q^, i.e., the resource is a semi­
fixed resource for the i*"^ product, 
2. constant throughout for any value of q^s 0, i.e., the 
resource is a fixed resource for the i^^ product. 
3. iiioriotonically but not strictly increasing in q^ ^  0. 
Now since g..(0) = 0, the function in 2 above would have the 
, . th 
property that gj^(q^) = 0 for any value of q^ ^  0, i.e., the j resource 
is not needed in the production of the i*"^ commodity. It may be noted 
that we have already assumed that is a convex and differentiable 
function of q^. Hence, g^^ is continuous and cannot have any corner 
point and since it is convex, it cannot have any inflection point. 
Moreover, g_ is monotonie. Hence, any function in 3 above will start 
increasing at q^ = 0 and then slowly approach a horizontal asymptote 
and from q^ = q^, it would coincide with the horizontal asymptote. 
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Let b..  =  g . . ( q . ) '  Then b.. is the minimum amount of the resource 
11 1 
that is needed for producing any ^ q^. 
The function in 1 above is invertible. Let us invert it to 
derive the limitation function, 
- 1  (66) q^(bj^) = (bj^) for a given j and i, 
-1 
E.. is the inverse function g.. and b.. is the point at which it is 
evaluated. Since the inverse function of a monotonically strictly 
increasing function will inherit the same property, q^ = 0 at b.^ = 0. 
The function is therefore defined for b^^ SO. For a function having 
the property 2 above we define 
(67) q^(b.^) = +C0 , bj^^ 0. 
For a function having the property 3 above we, first of all, subdivide 
its domain into two intervals, 0 ^  q^ <: q^, q^ > q^. For the first 
closed and bounded interval the function has the property 1 and hence 
can be inverted to give 
(68a) q^(bj^) = qjJ(bj^), 0 ^  b^^ ^  b.^. 
For the open unbounded interval, we define 
(68b) q^(bj^) = 4^, b^^ > b_. 
At bj^, q^(bj^) = q^ and it jumps to infinity at b + ,  M o r e o v e r ,  
even for this function q. = 0 at b.. = 0, unless b., = 0, i.e., it has 
1 ji it 
the property 2 above. 
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The limitation functions in 66 - 68 have a simple economic interpre­
tation. It denotes the "maximum" amount of that can be produced 
with b^ 0, when all other resources except the resource, including 
all current inputs that are needed, are "available" in sufficient or 
more than sufficient quantity. In some cases, as we have seen, the 
"maximum" does not exist. But this is understood. Ignoring current 
inputs once again, which have no limit on their availability, the 
output capacity of a given supply of capital outfit, b^ =^b^^, b^^, 
..., , is given by the following nonclassical production function, 
(69) q^(b^) = min[ q^(b^^), q^(b2^), ..., . 
If at least one of the resource is needed for the production of the 
i^^ commodity, the above minimum will always exist. The above production 
function is nonclassical because it relates output with available supply 
of factors. The distinction between the two types of production 
functions will, however, disappear if, each product division is 
allocated a "correct" amount of resources, i.e., if for each ie I^, 
bj. - j C I„. 
Now for our divisionalized firm, the rules of the game are set in 
such a way that no product division will requisition more productive 
services than it intends to use in its production at a given set of 
internal prices. Suppose the i^ product division deviates from the 
above rule of the game. For any resource, for which at the optimal 
n 
output vector q , 2g..(q.) =b., this would mean that at the efficient 
i=lg^^ ^ 
set of price vector y , the j resource would be in short supply to the 
extent of over-requisitioning on the part of the i^^ sector, say, b.. -
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g., (q? ). So the price of the resource would be increased, i.e., the 
resource would be charged a positive price, even if at the optimal 
y°, y° was zero. (The latter possibility exists if y° is not uniquely 
determined, i.e., if there is degeneracy.) Now since at the "efficiency 
prices" all sectors break even: the i^^ sector cannot have more than ade-
0 
quate supply of the resource without showing deficit. Only when the 
resource is in excess supply the i^^ sector can have more of it 
than needed for production with impunity. However, if we introduce 
the cost of transferring any resource from the central division to 
any product division, each resource would have a minimum positive 
supply price for any product division and hence all excess supply 
of resources would be absorbed by the central division. 
It may be mentioned that if all g^^ functions have a property 1, 
i.e., if all the m n limitational functions are well defined and 
bounded then each and every product division will produce on the limita­
tional line, or the confluence region of the productive resources 
(Frisdi, 1965) as given by 
( 7 0 )  q . ( b . )  =  q . ( b i . )  =  q . ^ b 2 i )  =  . . .  =  
Generally, however, 70 would not hold for a multi-product firm and 
some of the limitation functions can become unbounded either at b.. = 0 
or at bj^ = 2ji' nonclassical production function 69 , however, 
can be written in another form. Let us assume that the output to be 
produced by all product divisions except the i^^^ division has been 
decided already. Define b..(. q) = b. - Z g..(q.)> Then the 
V J J' ' 
o 
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production function of is given by 
(71) q^ = min {q. q)] , ..., q^ ^^i^i }' 
o O 0 o o 
Equation 71 brings out the conditional nature of production function 
of any product division. It also shows that we have n-1 degrees of 
freedom in producing q. , for a given "b" vector. 
o 
Equation 71 shows why the concept of marginal (revenue) 
productivity of limitational factors (i.e., factors not in substitution 
relationship with each other) undergoes a dramatic transformation as 
we switch over from a single-product firm to a multi-product firm. 
With a given b vector the single-product firm has a zero degree of 
freedom. The forward marginal productivity of a limitational factor 
is zero while the backward marginal productivity is positive. As 
soon as we have more than one product, we gain one degree of freedom, 
the degree of assortment of the two products. While in a single-
product case any marginal increase in a limitational factor unless 
accompanied by an appropriate increase in other limitational factors 
does not result in any Increase in output, hence, revenue, in the case 
of multi-product firm any marginal increase in one resource that 
is fully utilized can be accommodated by changing the product mix, 
i.e., reshuffling resources in different product divisions. As a 
result forward marginal revenue productivity, mutatis mutandis, will 
turn out, generally, positive for a fully utilized resource and 
except for some corner points the backward and marginal revenue 
productivity will coincide. Two points can he made. If we consider 
relocation costs, then such a concept of marginal revenue productivity 
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is gross. The relocation cost, however, would be a discontinuous 
function of changes in the resource vector. Thus, if the firm acquires 
a capital outfit that exactly fits the requirements of a product-
division for a marginal change in its output program then other 
product divisions might not be disturbed. The consideration of 
relocation cost lends some importance to a balanced growth path of 
a firm that would be considered later. 
Let us now assume that g..(q.) = a..q., a.. s 0. i e I , j e I * ji 1 ji 1 ji n' m 
The problem (P) now becomes a quadratic programming problem: 
(Q) " i q'Nq 
subject to Aq ^ b 
0 ^  q ^ d 
(63a) and (63b) become 
(63e) c' - q° M - y° A - ^0 
, 0  o' 0 o' o 0  '  -
c q - q Mq - y Aq - w q = 0 
(63f) b - Aq° 2 0 
, ' O O ' . 0 „ b y  -  q  A y  = 0  
while (c) and (d) remain unchanged. 
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v.. becomes a..q.,ieijel. Ifq..>0, for some j, i, ji Ji 1 n' m 
then g.^ satisfies property 1. If a^^ = 0 for some j and i, 
satisfies property 2. These two cases are now mutually exclusive. 
- b 
q.(b..) , if a.. ^ 0, for some j and i. 
^ 1 1 1  a . . '  j L  ji 
q.(b..)= +* if a.. = 0, for some i and i. 
Ji Ji 
Equation 69 now becomes 
^i' ^ 2i "mi' 
. J ^li ^2i ^mi\. 
J. (bp - mm I —, —, . .., —j, 
equation 71 becomes 
''j 
min/^ ^ o 
k  =  j l  i -
O " JI 
Lastly, writing the Lagrangian for the quadratic programming problem 
and evaluating at q°, y°, and w°, we get 
. o o o, , o 1 o' n , oV, a o. 
0(q 5 y J W ) = C'q - 2 q Mq + y (b - Aq ; + 
o'/j 0\ 
w (d - q ) 
' o o',, , 1  o' 0  , o' o'. o 
=  c q  -  q  M q + ^ ^ q  M q  + y  b - y  A q  +  
o', o' o 
w d - w q 
= y° b + i q° Mq° + w° d (by (63d)). 
Hence, the dual to the quadratic programming problem is given by 
min , 1 , ' 
y b + —  q M q + w d  
q, y, w 2 ^  ^ 
1 
subject to A y + Mq + w ^  c, y ^ 0, q ^ 0, w ^  0. 
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CHAPTER VII: THE OPTIMAL CAPACITY EXPANSION 
POLICY FOR A MULTI-PRODUCT FIRM 
In the last chapter, a static one-period optimization model for a 
multi-product firm was presented. The problem was: 
max c ' q - q'Mq 
(P) 
n 
subject to Z g..(q.) ^  b , j e I . 
i=l ^ J 
OîSq. sd., iel • 
1 n 
We now introduce some dynamic equations which will link together 
the above programming problems into the framework of a dynamic over-period 
optimization problem. Of course, we have a lot of choice in the 
specification of the exact nature of these dynamic equations. However, 
we should try to retain one essential feature of our static one-period 
model that should not be allowed to evaporate in a steady-state solution 
of the dynamic system, namely, we should stipulate that the multi-product 
firm should not degenerate into a specialized single-product firm. 
Furthermore, we should not unnecessarily complicate the picture 
so that the ultimate model becomes sterile, devoid of any interesting 
results and incapable of giving any insight into the dynamic process 
of the growth of a multi-product firm. With the latter purpose in 
view, we introduce a few simplifying assumptions. 
Firstly, we assume a given technology, i.e., the scalar functions 
j e I^, i e are not time dependent. Secondly we assume that 
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d(t) is growing over time exogeneously. However, at each t, d(t) is 
known, t=0, 1, T-1. The vector c and the matrix M involve d(t) 
and some other parameters which we assume to be constant over time. 
So once d(t) is known,c(t) and M(t) are also known. 
Suppose the firm starts with an outfit of capital goods b(o). By 
solving a problem like P, z(o) is determined. For other periods, b(t) 
is still unknown. Let us assume that the firm solves a problem like 
P for each possible value of b(t) >0 in each time period t=l, 2, 
T-1, where T is the end of planning horizon for the group of managers, 
who are, at present in charge of the firm. T may be the period up to 
which the present group of managers expects to retain control. 
z(t), t=l, 2, ..., T-1 is therefore a function of b(t) and d(t): 
q(t) being maximized out. The transformation function we can write 
as z(b(t), t), where t takes into account the effect of d(t) on z(t). 
The function z(t) is a piece-wise smooth concave function of b(t), 
for which at least one sided partial derivatives always exist and they 
are monotonically decreasing in each bj(t). 
A few words might be in order about the specific role of d(t) in 
our dynamic model. The optimization problem before the firm Is to 
adjust b(t) to d(t) growing over time so that some preference functional 
over time is optimized. But once d(t) is introduced it is excluded 
from our dynamic model and all its effects are incorporated into z(t). 
The same is true of q(t), the optimum output vector in t. It might 
thus appear that we have, in effect, a one-good model, the good being 
dollars, v;ith more than one capital good. We shall, however, claim 
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that though d(t) and q(t) do not appear in the over-period optimization 
problem explicitly, they are always there, in the one-period optimization 
problem that determines z(t). 
As regards the vector b(t), we make two assumptions. In the 
first place, for each j e I^, b^(t) is subject to a constant rate of 
depreciation (evaporative decay) 3^^ > 0 over time. Besides, at the 
end of each period, bj(t) is increased by 3j(t) > 0 (gross of deprecia­
tion) by the firm so that at any time, t, bj(t) is given by the following 
dynamic equation; 
(72) b.(t+l) = b.(t) - 9^ b.(t) +3j(t); t=0, 1, 2, ..., T-l 
b.(t) = b (o); t=0; j e I^. 
bj(o) is the element of the initial vector b(o) with which 
the firm starts. 3^(t), j e t=0, 1, ..., T-l are raT control 
variables. We assume that for any t, t=0, 1, ... T-l, 3j(t) belongs 
to the closed bounded set: 
(73) K[9(t)] = a(t).I(t) 
where ;(t)={e^(t), ^^(t), @^(t)}GR'";9(t):^ 0. 
I(t) is the investible fund at time t. The scalar function K does 
not involve t explicitly and has the following neoclassical properties: 
Kjp(t)] > 0; K.J3(t)] > 0 
(74) J 
Kj(o) = Kj(+™) = 0 
where K.[3(t)] is the partial derivative of K[0 (t)] with respect to 
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gj(t), i.e., the marginal cost of expansion of bj(t), gross of deprecia­
tion. a(t) is the proportion of investible fund that is invested at 
t for augmenting the resource vector b(t) in the next period. It is 
also a control variable, subject to the following restriction: 
(75) 0 a(t) ^  1, t=0, 1, ..., T-2, a(T-l) =1. 
At t=T-l, the entire investible fund is invested. A proportion 
of z(t) is being distributed as dividends, at time t, to the owners 
of the firm; 
(76) c(t) = Y(t)z(t); 0 ^  Y (t) ^  1. 
From 75 and 76, we deduce the investible fund at time t, given 
by the following dynamic equation: 
(77) I(t) = [1 - Y(t)]z(t) + R(t)[l - a(t-l)] I(t-l), 
t=l, 2 ,  ..., T-1 
(77a) T(o) = r 1 -v('o)]zCo) 
where R(t) is the interest factor at which one dollar invested at time 
t-1 will be multiplied at t, t=l, 2, 3, ..., T-1. 
We now define a utility function on c(t), 
(78a) W(t) = W[Y  (t)z(t)], t=0, 1, T-1. 
W(t) is the current utility at time t. 
It may be noted that W[c(t)] function does not involve t 
explicitly, so the form of the utility (or one-period welfare) function 
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remains stationary over time. For our purpose, we do not need a 
cardinal measure of the utility function; so we shall assume that the 
utility function is unique only up to increasing linear transformation 
for which the origin is fixed at the zero-level of utility (to be de­
fined) . In other words, the utility function can be subjected to 
uniform contraction or stretching by multiplying W by a positive 
constant. We also assume that W[c(t)] is twice-differentiable with 
the following properties; 
Since the origin is fixed 78b makes sense both mathematically and 
economically; no consumption, no utility Equation 78c implies there is no 
saturation and 78d , the concavity of W(c(t)). Since the first and 
second derivatives of W(t) will preserve signs under the admissible 
transformation 78b and 78c also make sense. 
At the end of the T-1^^ period, the firm ends up with a capital 
outfit b(T), which the present group of managers hands over to the 
succeeding group of managers. We define a scrap value function S[b(T)] 
on the vector-variable b(t) with properties similar to utility function, 
namely. 
(78b) W(o) = 0 
(78c) W' (c(t)) > 0; c(t) 2: 0 
(78d) W" (c(t)) < 0; c(t) s 0. 
(78e) S(0) = 0; VS[b(T)] > 0 
where 
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(78f) S[b(T)] is concave in b(T). 
One immediate result of the assumptions 78a-78e is the marginal 
evaluation of one unit of consumption good now would not be the same 
as the marginal evaluation of one unit of consumption good one period 
later if c(t) is growing over time. This gives one reason for a 
preference for ante-dating or advancing the timing of consumption 
which is not related anyway to "pure time preference" or "impatience" 
for advancing the timing of enjoyment, or the utility of consumption, 
due to myopia or defective telescopic faculty. 
The dynamic model works out as follows: 
Y ( O ) Z ( O )—)W(o) Y (l)z(l)—)W(1) 
Î , T 
b^—>z(o)—>!^o)—(o)—»b(l)—»z(l)—>•1(1)—(1)—»b(2) 
[ l-a(o)] I(o) > R(l)[ l-a(o)] I(o) 
Y ( T -1)Z ( T -1) >W(T-1) S[b( T ) ]  
T T 
b(T-l)—» z(T-l) » I(I-1)-»B (T-D—»b(T) 
Given the initial vectors d(o) and b(o), z(o) is determined by maximizing 
q(o), subject to the restrictions of P . Of this z(o), ^ (0)2(0) is 
distributed as dividends which results in W(o), the total utility at 
t=0. At t=0, 1(0) = [1-Y (o)]z(o). Of this I(o), a(o)I(o) is spent 
on 3 (0) subject to the restriction 73 . The residual portion is 
added to 1(1) multiplied by the interest rate factor R(o). 
Once 3 (o) is determined, b(l) is determined according to Equation 
72 . This, together with d(l), determine z(l). Once again y (l)z(1) 
is distributed generating the flow of utility W(l) in t=l. The residual 
portion is added to 1(1). 
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1(1) is determined according to Equation 77 and of this CT(1)1(1) 
is invested and so on. The process continues until the T-l*"^ period 
ends. At t=T-l, the entire I (t-1) accumulated from the past plus the contri 
bution of the T-l*"^ period to it is invested and 0 (T-1) and hence b(T) 
is determined. In the T^^ period, the process comes to an end and 
no production takes place, i.e., q(T)=0. The utility enjoyed at 
t=T is therefore S[b(T)], 
We have not yet specified the preference functional over time 
that is to be maximized. The simplest assumption is that the firm 
would maximize some functional of W(t), t=0, 1, ..., T-1 and S(T). 
It may be noted that W(t) is the current utility enjoyed at t, and 
S (T) has a similar interpretation. So unless intertemporal comparison 
of utility enjoyed at different time periods is possible, we cannot 
compare them, let alone add them up. 
One possible approach may be to search for points along the 
utility-possibility frontier. We have (m+2)T control variables, g(t), 
Y (t) for t=o, 1, ..., T-1, and cr(t) for t=0, 1, ..., T-1, of th&s 
one a (T-1), is already determined. Let us choose the other control 
parameters subject to all the restraints in the system. Once they 
are so chosen they will generate an attainable utility path, W(o), W(l), 
..., W(T-l), S(T). Let T be the set of all such attainable paths. 
Define 
W = {w(o), W(l), W(T-l), S(T)} 
Then W° is efficient if and only if there is no other path W' in T such 
that 
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(79a) W' ^  W° 
(79b) W' e r 
The inequality in 79a implies that W'(t) ^  W°(t), t=l, T-1 and 
S'(T) s S°(T), and W' ^  W°. So at least for one period the utility 
path W' generates a greater flow of utility than W°. 
Now, since this is a "vector-maximum" problem, under certain condi­
tions of convexity of the set r and nonsaturation, this would generate 
an appropriate price vector jp(o), p(l), ..., p(T)j" such that W° is 
the solution of the following scalar maximization problem^ 
T-1 
max Z p(t) W(t) + p (T) S (T) 
t=0 
(80) 
subject to |W(o), W(l), ..., W(T-l), S(T)} e T -
Since p(t) will be determined only up to a multiplicative constant we 
may set p(o) = 1, assuming p(o) > 0. We may call p(t) the weightage 
function. If p (t) satisfies 0 < p(t) < 1 for all t, t=l, T, then 
it can also be viewed as a discount function. 
For each point on the utility-possibility frontier we can derive 
an appropriate weightage function, provided certain constraint qualifi­
cations are satisfied so that we can utilize the separating hyperplane 
theorem of convex bodies. However, it is easy to see that by this 
procedure we can only obtain a quasi-ordering of all utility paths 
contained in Ï* , i.e., we cannot obtain a top level optimum. 
^Any homothetic transformation will preserve the ordering of the 
discounted sum. 
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A simpler approach and the one that we are going to follow is to 
assume that a weightage function over time is already defined for the 
firm. Let p(t) be such a weightage function. Once again we set p(o)=l. 
Thus, one unit of utility enjoyed at time t=t' is equivalent to p(t') 
units of utility at t=0, and this "terms of trade" will remain unaffected 
by a change of scale of W. If 0 < p(t) < 1, for t=l, ..., T, then 
p(t) can be called a discount function and the rate of discount at 
. . .  ,  P ( t - l )  1  
time t  i s  g i v e n  b y  ^ ^ ^ '  -  1 .  
We may also note that if we set p(t) = 1 for all t, we get a 
"Ramsey" type preference functional. p(t) = 1 implies that there is 
no preference for advancing the timing of future utilities, i.e., 
there is no impatience (Koopmans, 1967). If we set p(t) = 0, for t=0, 
1, ..., T-1, and p(T) = 1, then by choosing the S function appropriately 
we can reduce the problem to that of maximizing the terminal capital 
stock b(T), starting from an initial b(o). 
A third line of approach is also possible. Instead of maximizing 
a preference functional of W(t), t=0, ... T-1, and S(T), one may be 
interested in the rate of growth of one-period utility over time. If 
T is infinity, this approach leads to the maximization of some long-run 
rate of change (Radner, 1966). We shall consider a somewhat related 
approach in the next chapter. 
We start with a simple situation when no transfer of investible 
funds over time is possible. This means 
(81) Y(t) + a(t) = 1; 0 ^ a(t) ^ 1, 0 ^  y (t) ^  1. 
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The problem before the firm is 
T-1 
max Z p(t)W(c(t)) + p(T)S[b(T)] 
t=0 
where c(t) = [1- G (t)]z(t) = Y (t)z(t) 
subject to bj(t+l) = [l-g^^] b^(t) +3^(t), j e t=0, 1, 2, T-1 
z(t) = z(b(t),t), t=0, 1, T-1 
K@ (t)) = a(t) z (t) . 
To start with we assume that z(b(t),t) is continuously differentiable 
in each b^(t). We shall relax the assumption later. 
The Lagrangian^ is 
T-1 r ) 
L = Z p(t)W |[l-a(t)]z(t)} + p(T)S[b(T)] 
t=0 
T-1 r ] 
+ Z p(t)V (t)4z[b(t), t] - z(t)[ 
t=0 
m T-1 r -j 
+ Z Z p(t) Jt) jb (t+1) - b (t)[l-3 ] +0 .(t)^ 
j=l t=0 ^ J J oj J 
+ Z X p(t) -[a(t)z(t) - K[3(t)]|. 
t=0 ^ ^ 
Assuming necessary regularity conditions so that second order 
conditions are satisfied and internal maximization, we differentiate 
L with respect to control variables and set them equal to zero. 
Differentiation with respect to a(t), t=0, 1, T-1, gives, 
^Generally the discount function is not attached to the undetermined 
multipliers. This is done for facilitating comparison with discrete 
control problems. 
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(82) -p(t) W'[c(t)]z(t) +X(t)p(t)z(t) = 0 
or 
(82a) W'[c(t)] =\(t), t=0, 1, T-1. 
Differentiation with respect to ^ ^(t), j e t=0, 1, T-1 gives, 
(83) p(t)n.(t) - X(t)p(t)K.(t) = 0 
or 
(83a) ^ .(t) = X (t)K.(t) = W'[c(t)]K.(t) 
or 
(83b) ^  (t)/Kj(t) = \(t) = W'[c(t)] (from (82a)) 
j~l, 2, •••, ni 
t=0, 1, ..., T-1 
Suppose an optimal b°(t), t=l, 2, T and z°(t), t=0, 1, 2, 
T-1 exist. Differentiating L with respect to these state variables, 
evaluating at b°(t), t=l, 2, T, z°(t), t=0, 1, 2, T-1, we 
get the time path of co-state variables by the adjoint or the perfect 
foresight equations, 
(84a) p(t) i; (t) + p(t-l)p,.(t-l) - p(t)i.(t)(l-;^.) = 0 
j e I^, t=l, 2, T-1 
(84b) p(t) + p(T.l)i.(T-l) = 0; j e 
(85) p(t) W'[c(t)][l-a(t)] - p(t)i/(t) +p(t)\(t)o(t) = 0 
t=0, 1, 2, T-1 
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From 82 and 85 
(86) |;(t) = X(t) = W'{c(t)]-, t=0, 1, 2, T-1. 
Equation (84a) is a difference equation which can be solved making use 
of the terminal condition 84b. Using 86 and 84a 
p(T-2) ^  (T-2) = p(T-l) ^ .(t-l)(l-0^.) 
or 
- pw-i> t(T-i) ] 
Continuing in this way, we derive 
T-1 
Z 
T=t+r ""j 
" 
(87a) z Jp(T)w'(c(T)) x 
4^}. J •= V 2 T-1' 
(87c) p(t-l) My (t-1) = p(t) ^ j(t)(14)^j) - p(t) \(t) X 
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Economic interpretations of the co-state variables are as follows. 
First consider [X^CT-l). The expression within braces in 87b is the 
discounted marginal contribution of one more unit of bj(t) at the begin­
ning of the period, j e I^. So (0,^(1-1) is the current cost of 
foregoing this contribution for not having one more unit of the type 
of capital goods, j e I^, at the beginning of period. 
Consider |j,^(t), t=0, 1, ..., T-2. A gift of one unit of the 
capital to the firm at the beginning of the t+l*"^ period is equivalent to 
the service of one more unit of capital good of the type in the t+1^^ 
period, (1-3^^) unit of similar good at Ae t+2^ period, (l-p^^)^ unit of 
similar good at the t+3^^ period and so on until the T^^ period, when the 
chapter is closed. Thus, such an once-for-all gift will generate 
a stream of income flow and the expression within braces in 87a 
is the discounted value of such an income stream. Now since one unit 
of utility at t=0 is equivalent to l/p(t) unit of utility at t, ix^Ct) 
is the current value of the cost of foregoing such an income stream 
that would result from a gift of one unit of the capital good at the end 
of the t*"^ period, j e t=0, 1, ..., T-2. Hence, ^ j(t) is the 
current opportunity lost for not increasing 3j(t) by one unit, j e 
t=0, 1, ..., T-2. Kj(t) is the current marginal cost of increasing 
Pj(t) by one unit. Equation 83b indicates that for all types of 
capital goods, j £ I^, in each time period t=0, 1, T-1, the 
ratio of the opportunity lost for not having one more unit of the 
capital good and the marginal cost of one more unit of the capital 
good should be equal to X (t). Equation 83b therefore indicates 
the optimum allocation rule of the investible fund a(t) z(t) at 
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t=0, 1, T-1. ^(t) is the common marginal rate of return that will 
obtain for each capital good that the firm would lose for not diverting 
one more unit to capacity expansion. Equation 82a tells us that 
this common rate of return foregone should be equal to marginal utility 
of consumption at time t, i.e., \ (t) is the current opportunity cost 
of one unit of investment good. Equation 87c tells us that the dis­
counted value of the opportunity lost for not having one more unit of 
capital good of the type at the end of the t-1^^ period is equivalent 
to the discounted value of the opportunity lost for not having (l-P^^) 
unit of similar good at the end of the t^^ period minus the discounted 
value of the marginal revenue productivity of one unit of capital good of 
the j type multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption in the 
period, t=l, 2, ..., T-1. In other words (by changing signs of all 
expressions of 87c), the discounted value of a gift of one unit of capital 
of the type (j el^) at the end of the t-1^^ period is equivalent 
to its marginal contribution to utility stream (discounted) in the t^^ 
period plus a gift of (1-3^^) unit of the capital good at the end of the 
t^^ period, t=l, 2, —, T-1. 
The difference equation, 84a, is nonautonomous, since it 
involves z(t), which involves t explicitly. However, it can be made 
autonomous on a particular type of growth paths which are called 
balanced growth paths that we shall discuss in the next chapter. 
Letting T go to infinity, the difference equation will have a stationary 
solution if the following condition holds 
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(88) p(t-1) n.- = p(t) (1-0^.) - p(t) Ut) ' j e I^. 
Hence, the stationary value is given by 
- p(t)(l-e^.)-p(t-l) ' j = 
It may be noted that since is the marginal revenue productivity of 
thej*"^ capital good and \ (t) is equal to the marginal utility of consump­
tion good at t, [i . is equal to _ . ^ TTTT times the marginal utility 
J pCt)(i-|j^j)-p(t-i; 
of the capital good multiplied by a term, which if 3^^ = 0' 
(no depreciation) is equal to the reciprocal of the discount rate 
at time t. The difference equation gives the time path of b(t), once 
3(t) is determined. Once b(t) is determined q(t) can be determined 
by solving P, or from the value of q(t) that corresponds to z(b(t),t). 
Now all capital goods will grow at the same constant rate G, 
if the following relation holds 
(89) b7(t) ~ ^  oj G, for all j e t=0, 1, 2, ... . 
There are, however, no special reasons to assume that 89 will be 
fulfilled. 
Let us now consider the following equivalent, one period long-
run problem for our over-period optimization problem 
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max p(t) H(t) = max p(t) w|[ 1-CT (t)] z (t)]• 
0 (t), a(t) 3 (t),a(t) 
m 
(L) + 2 [p(t-l) ^L.(t-l) - p(t) n Jt)(l-B .)] b (t+l) 
j=2 J J oj J 
m 
+ 2 p(t) M-.(t) 3 (t) 
j=l J j 
subject to 
K[3(t)] = a(t)z(t), z(t) = z[b(t),t] for t=0, 1, T-2. 
Except for the terminal conditions 84b, 82, 83, 84a, and 85 can 
be obtained by setting up the Lagrangian corresponding to problem (L) 
and differentiating it with respect to P(t), CT(t) and b(t), z(t). The 
Lagrangian can be written as 
p(t) w{[l-a(t)]z(t)} + Z [p(t-l) n .(t-1) - p(t) n .(t)(l-3 .)]x 
^  J = X  J  J  O J  
b (t+l) + Z p(t) M- . (t) 3 . (t) + p(t) V (t) jz[b(t),t]-2(t) |- + 
J J J 
X(t) p(t)|p(t)z(t)-K[3 (t)]j-. 
Let us now relax some of the assumptions we started with. Define r^(t) 
= j e r(t) = -X(t), t=0, 1, 2, T-1. r^(t) is the 
marginal evaluation of a gift of capital good of the type at the end of 
the t^^ period. It is concave and monetonically decreasing function of 
bj(t). So as 3j(C) will rise r^(t) will fall and vice versa. 
Suppose at some choice of 3j(t) = j3 ( t ), ^  ^(t), 3^(l:)j, 
we have 
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M, (t) (t) 
K.(t) ^  ,  j, 4 e j /  4, 
then 
r (t) r (t) 
If 3j(t) is decreased then Kj(t) will fall and r^ft) will rise. So 
assuming that 0^(t), 4 ^  k, remains fixed one way to restore equality 
in 83b is to decrease 3.(t), provided K.., j ^  4 is either nonpositive 
J 
(i.e., capital goods are not complementary in production) or negligible. 
However, if gj(t) = 0, then it cannot be reduced further. However, 
0^(t) can be increased. But there is a limit up to which B^(t), and 
for that matter any gj(t), j e I^, can be increase^ provided by the 
constraint 73. So ultimately we will reach a situation in each t=0, 
1, . ., T~1, 
r, (t) 
= r(t), j e I J _ '  <  
Njkc; . - m 
and gj(t) = 0 if the strict inequality holds. Translating in terms of 
^j(t) and ?i(t), 83b can be vnritten as 
> 
- \(t), j c t-0, 1, T-1 
and 3j(t) = 0 if the strict inequality hold. It is possible that 3j(t) / 0 
for only one type of capital good. But the forms of the function KO(t)) 
and z(b(t),t) make it very unlikely. 
Consider 82 ., if \(t) >W'(c(t)), t=0,l,...,T-1, then it indicates 
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that cr(t) should be increased. As a(t) is increased c(t) will fall 
and W'(c(t)) will rise. But if a(t) = 1 (i.e., y (t)=0) then no further 
rise is possible. Similarly if X(t) < W'(c(t)), a(t) should be decreased. 
But if o(t) = 0, (Y(t) = 1) no further decrease is possible. 
Lastly, z(t) may not be differentiable in each bj(t), j e I^. 
Equations 87b and 87c then have to be replaced by the following 
inequalities. 
(87e) fSzlb(t).tl> _ p(t-l) . J 
V 3b (t) )- X(t) p(t) l(t) 
 ^( ^1b'(t)'')+ • t'l. 2 T-l, j e V 
Similar changes have to be made in 87a . 
Let us now consider the more general model. Once again we start 
assuming the mathematical regularity conditions and internal maximization. 
For simplicity, we now drop z(t) as a state variable, replacing it by 
z(b(t),t), a function of b(t) and t, t=0, 1, 2, T-1. As a result 
one constraint for each t, t=0, 1, ..., T-1 is dropped. 
The Lagrangian is 
T-1 r . 
L = 2 p(t) W \ Y(t) z [b(t), t]^ + p(T) S [b(T)] + 
t=0 ^ 
T-1 m 
Z Z p(t) M, (t) \ b (t+1) - (1-B .) b (t) + 9 (t)L + 
-I-I J ^ J J J ^ 
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T-1 r 
2 P(t) Ti,(t) |l(t) - R(t) [1- a(t-l)] I(t-l) -
t=l 
[l-r(t)] z [b(t),t] I + 
Tl(o) {l(o) - [1-Y ( O )] z[b(o)] + 
Z p(t) Ut) {a(t) 1(C) - K [0(t)]} 
t=0 
We first differentiate L with respect to control variables and 
set the resulting expressions equal to zero. Differentiation with 
respect to y(t), t=0, 1, T-1 gives 
(90) p(t) W'[c(t)] z[b(t),t] + p(t) Tl(t) z[b(t),t] = 0 
t=0, 1, ,.., T-1 
(90a) Ti(t) = -W'[c(t)] (assuming z[b(t),t] ^  0) 
t=0, 1, ..., T-1. 
Differentiation with respect to cr(t), t=0, 1, ..., T-2 gives 
(91) p(t+l) Tl,(t+1) R(t+1) I(t) + p(t) X(t) I(t) = 0 
t=0, 1, .T-2. 
Assuming I(t) ^  0, 90a and 91 give 
(92) /(t) = W'[c(t+1)] R(t+1), t=0, 1, ..., T-2. 
Differentiation with respect 3j(t), j e t=0, 1, ..., T-1 gives 
(93a) p(t) iJ,.(t) - p(t) X{t) Kj[P(t)] = 0 
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(93b) = X(t) and if Kj(t) ^  0 
(93c) Kj[9j(C)] " t=0' •••' T-l" 
Now once the control variables are chosen, L is differentiated 
at b(t) = b°(t), t=l, 2, T and I(t) = I°(t), t=0, 1, T-1 
and setting resulting expressions to zero, we derive the adjoint 
equations for the co-state variables. Differentiation with respect to 
j e Ijjj, t=l, 2, T-1, gives 
(94) p(t) W'[c(t)] Y(t) + P(t-l) ^ .(t-1) - p(t) l^.(t)(l-0^.) + 
p(t) T;(t)[l-Y(t)] jt] = 0, t=l, 2, T-1 . 
Differentiation with respect to bj(T), j e gives 
(95) 0(T) + P(T-I) p,(T-l) = 0, jel„. 
J  
Differentiation with respect to I(t), t=0, 1, T-2, gives 
(96) T;(o) + A,(o) o(o)  = 0 
(97) p(t) T|(t) - p(t4-l) Tl(t+1) R(t+1) [l-a(t3 + p(t) \(t) a(t) = 0 
t=l, 2, ..., T-2 
Using 91 and assuming I(t) 0, 96 and 97 can be combined by 
(98) p(t) Tl(t) = p(t+l) TKt+l) R(t+1), t=0, 1, 2, T-2. 
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Using 91, 98 and 90a, we get 
(99) X (t) = -Tl(t) = W[c(t)] , t=0, 1, 2, T-2. 
Differentiation with respect to I(T-l) gives 
(100) p(T-l) + p(T-l) x(T-l) a(T-l) = 0 
or 
(100a) ^(T-1) = -\(T-1), since a(T-l) = 1. 
So we get by combining 99, 100a and 90a, 
(101) A(t) = -Tl(t) = W'[c(t)] , t=0, 1, T-1. 
Equation 101 can be used to simplify 95, to give 
(102) p(t-l) n .(t-1) - P(t) ^  .(t)(l-0^.) = p(t) X{t) 
t=0, 1, ..., T-1. 
Equation 102 corresponds to 84a. 
Economic interpretations of ^^(t) and iV(t) remain unchanged. The 
only new element is Tl(t) and the following equation. 
(103) X(t) = W'[c(t+1)] • R(t+1), t=0, 1, ..., T-2. 
"P|(t) is the cost of foregoing one more unit of consumption at t 
and 101 and 103 tell us that the common rate of return on investment 
at t, that is foregone by not investing in capital goods should not 
only be equal to the marginal utility of consumption at t, t=0, 1, ..., 
T-1, but should also be equal to the opportunity cost of postponing the 
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investment (or consumption) by one more time unit for t=0, 1, T-2. 
This is due to the extra option for the firm due to the possibility 
of transferring of investible fund over time. It may be noted that 
though nothing is consumed out of investible funds anything added to 
I(t) at t-1 helps to make an additional sum available for consumption 
unless Y(t) = 1, since [1-Y(t)]z(t) is added to I(t), at t, t=0, 1, 
...; T-1. 
We shall not discuss what modifications are needed if we relax the 
assumption of internal maximization as we have already discussed that 
in detail for our simplified model and the analysis would be largely 
similar. A few words may be added as regards some of our "economic'' 
assumptions. 
In the first place prices are assumed to be given. In a linear 
model if the "c" vector changes at a scalar rate A. > 0, (i.e., price 
minus average variable cost for all products changes proportionately) 
the output vector would remain the same and only z will change to 
\z, and y°, the dual price vector to \y°. Even for our quadratic model 
this would not be true. However, if we make d +=" , then our quadratic 
model Q, in Chapter VI collapses to a linear programming model. However, 
linearity might be a hindrance rather than a help in a dynamic model 
of a firm. In the usual linear programming model of a firm, the firm 
starts with an elastically given supply of scarce resources with 
potential capacity limits. Since the vector "b" has the dimensionality 
of m, at most m linearly independent vectors are needed to express b as 
their linear combination. If we make the usual nondegeneracy assumption 
then b cannot be expressed as a linear combination of less than m vectors 
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that appear either as a process vector or as a slack vector. In other 
words the rank of any matrix formed out of b vector and any m-l vectors 
of n+m vectors (n process vectors and m slack vectors) should be m. 
Let us assume that each process produces one product. Then the very 
fact of the presence of m Inelastically given scarce resources, which 
cannot be substituted for each other in a production process and non-
degeneracy forces the firm to be a multi-product one unless in the 
optimal "basis" m-l vectors are slack vectors, i.e., m-l out of a 
total of m resources that correspond to these slack vectors are not 
fully utilized. Naturally such a situation is considered unlikely. 
Similarly a situation where all of the m resources are fully utilized 
is considered accidental. Thus, the programming theory has the "realistic 
overtones" of a real world firm which usually produces more than one 
product and has excess capacity. However, when we take a dynamic 
view of a multi-product firm, the b vector cannot be considered 
given. It can be adjusted to producing any optimal output program 
completely spelled out at the time of planning. The nondegeneracy 
assumption should then be dropped. There is no reason why b vector 
cannot suitably be chosen so that it is an exact linear combination 
of less than m vectors. In fact it may be so adjusted that it is a 
scalar multiple of one process vector. 
Changes in the b vector is considered in the context of planning 
by Courtillot (1962). However, he assumed that the change in the b 
vector will be determined by considering only the contribution of 
this change to revenue in the immediately next period. But if the 
resource is durable we should also take into account its contribution 
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to revenue in the subsequent periods. Only if the period in question is 
long enough to coincide with the payoff period the firm requires, is such 
a sequential solution of linear programming models possible. Similar 
approaches can be found in Day's (1963) dynamic land utilization model 
and in Day and Tinney's (1969) dynamic cobweb models, though the inter­
pretations of the right-hand side of a linear programming model do 
not correspond to that given above. However, one feature of their 
recursive programming models is they point out the possibility that 
in a stationary solution of these dyanmic models the multi-product 
firm may degenerate into a single product firm. There are of course 
a lot of ways in which such an outcome can be avoided. Technical 
interdependence of processes may be one possibility. Another possibility 
is to introduce probabilistic considerations. Diversification then 
becomes a means of reducing risk and hence increasing the expected 
utility of a risk-averting producer, and unutilized capacity then 
becomes reserve capacity to increase system reliability. Another 
possibility is when K[3(t)] function is concave. To take advantage 
of economies of scale, building ahead of demand may be profitable and 
thus creating cxcass capacity and a desire to explore alternative 
channels of production. We have introduced the "sales constraints" for 
that specific purpose. The firm produces more than one product because 
though it has the ability to expand, it is being approached by an 
ever-receding saturation point of growth in a particular line of 
production. The sales limits are growing because of "natural" growth fac­
tors, such as the growth of population. Such a view of a firm seems more 
appropriate for an industrial firm. A firm which, being subject to wide 
Ill 
price swings, diversify as a means of reducing risk and hence to 
increase the utility of a risk-averting producer-owner is more likely 
to be an agricultural firm. In fact, for an industrial firm, a change 
in price has no definite meaning as the quality of the good is changing. 
Technical changes are, however, much more important for an industrial 
firm. But to a large extent such changes are similar to changes in 
b vector, if we consider, as we have done, only limitational factors. 
To be definite let us consider the linear programming model once again. 
If a., is reduced byAa... thenAa,.q? amount of the resource will be 
released, i.e., we haveAb. =Aa..q.. This will lead to an increase 
J 1 
in 2 byAa^^q?y°, where y° is the marginal revenue productivity of the 
resource. It may be noted that if either the resource was not fully 
utilized before (i.e., y° = 0) or if q° = 0, (i.e., the i^^ commodity was 
not produced), z would not be changed unless the reduction in a^^ is 
large enough to bring i''^ process in the basis. Since technical change 
also entails costs, the effects of technical changes would be similar 
to capacity expansion of a particular resource or a group of such 
resources. 
Lastly, it may be noted that though we have not allowed for external 
borrowing, such borrowings can be introduced easily if at any moment 
the fund raised from outside, net of costs of borrowing to the firm,is 
proportional to the firm's internal investible fund. In that case 
c(t) could be greater than one. 
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CHAPTER VIII: BALANCED GROWTH PATH FOR AN EXPANDING FIRM 
In Chapter VI, we presented a quadratic programming model, Q. 
If we set = 0 and = m^, we obtain the following quadratic 
programming problem: 
V / \ 1 ""i 2 
max Z " 2 d~ ^ i " ^  
i=l i 
(Q) 
n 
Subject to 2 a..q. <: b., jel, O^q. ^ d.,iel 
. , 11 1 1 m' i' n 1=1 •' 
m ,  S O ;  d .  > 0 ,  i  e l  ;  b .  > 0 ,  j  e l  .  
1 1 n J m 
Since the constraint set is closed and bounded and the objective 
function is strictly concave in q, a unique optimal q° will exist. 
Suppose d is increased to d =\d where À > 1. If b is also increased 
to b = ?.b, then we have a balanced growth of the firm for it can be 
shown that q° = Xq° and z = 
PROOF Consider the problem Q. 
Since q° exists and Slater's condition is satisfied at q = 0, by 
the necessary and sufficient Kuhn-Tucker conditions, there exists an 
optimal vector -^y°, w°j' , such that 
0 
m.q. m 
(104a) p. - u. i—i - Z y. a.. - w. ^ 0, i e I 
1 d. Ji 1 n 
n , 2 -, m n 
(104b) Z |p.q° - u q° q° - w q° j + Z Z y° a q = 0 
1=1^ 1 1 ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ j=l i=l J J 
n Q 
(104c) b - Z a q. ^ 0, j e 
I  i=l 
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m ni n 
(104d) Z y°b. - Z Z y°a..q° = 0 
j=i J : j=i i=i : ' 
(104e) d. - q° ^  0, i e I 
11 n 
n 
(104f) Z w? (d. - q°) = 0. 
i=l 1 ^ ^ 
Now we make the necessary changes in Q, so that b and d replace the 
original b and d. For this new problem q*^, y°, w° satisfy all the 
optimality conditions 104a-104f. Hence q must be optimal for the 
problem Q(b, d). Now substituting in the objective function of Q(b, d), 
q° for q we get z = X z. Moreover, q° is the uniquely determined optimum 
output vector. A balanced growth path (or the "golden age" path) has 
attracted considerable attention in the literature on the efficient 
accumulation problem for the economy. Although, originally, such a 
growth path was invoked to get around the index number problem (Robinson, 
1956), later it has been shown that such a balanced growth path also 
characterizes the unique "optimal" growth path under certain conditions 
(Cass, 1965). However, there is no special reason why a firm, facing 
a problem like Q, should follow such a path even when the demand vector, 
d, grows at a constant rate over time. To bring that out let us 
consider the following simplified version of the optimal capacity 
expansion policy model that has been presented in the last chapter. 
" t t 1 (i) max Zp z[b(t), d?, ], 0 < p < 1 ;  —  >  X  > 1 ;  d > 0  
t=0 ^ 
(M) 
subject to (ii) bj(t+l) = b^(t)(l-3^j) +3j(t), j e t=0, 1, 2, ... , 
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0 < 3  .  < 1 ;  b . ( o )  i s  g i v e n ,  j  e  I  
oj J m 
B.(t) ^  0, j e t=0, 1, 2, 
(iii) K [0(t)] ^  a z[b(t), dX^], t=0, 1, 2, a > 0 
K(0) = 0; K^[3(t)] > 0 
K [3(t)] > 0; j e t=0, 1, 2, m 
where 0 is the null vector, K^, the partial derivative of K[3 (t)] 
with respect to Pj(t), the corresponding second partial, j e I^, 
t=0, 1, 2, ..,, m. 
It may be noted that the objective function in M can be derived 
from the preference functional over time of the last chapter, if we 
assume 
(105a) W[c(t)] is positive homogeneous in c(t), i.e., 
W[c(t)] = Q?c(t), where Q? > 0; 
(105b) c(t) = Yz(t), Y > 0; 
(105c) p(t) = p ; 
(105d) T = + 
When the above holds, the maximization of the objective function in M 
will lead to a maximization of the previously considered preference 
functional. The maximized value would be the same except for a constant 
factor oy > 0, which, by an appropriate choice of the unit of the 
utility scale, can be made unity. Moreover, we may now allow for 
Y + C7 > 1 or Y+ ^  < 1. The former possibility will exist if external 
borrowings (net of costs) proportional to internal financing is 
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possible, while the latter possibility may arise if the firm has to 
pay a fixed charge proportionate to 2(t), on account of taxes, etc. 
The Lagrangian for the problem M is now written as 
L = Z Z[b(t), d\t] 
t=0 
m 
+ z z P  M -.(t) [ b  (t+1) -  b  (t)(H )  -  3  (t)] 
t=0 j=l J J J oj J 
CO 
+ Z p^T](t) {aZ[b(t), - K[0(t)lj. 
t=0 ^ 
Since cr, the saving ratio is fixed, the control variables are 
3 j(t), j e I^, t=0, 1, 2, ... . 
We assume that all mathematical regularity conditions are 
satisfied and internal maximization with respect to each p^(t), j e 
t=0, 1, ... . Differentiating L with respect to0^(t) and setting 
the resulting expression to zero, we get 
(106a) ^j(t) - T, (t) Kj [3(t)l = 0. j e T^, t=0, 1, ... . 
Since (t)) > 0, for any 3j(t) > 0, and since we are assuming 
internal maximization with respect to each 3^(t), j e I^, we divide 
by [3 (t)] to get 
,(C) 
(10Gb) K.[ P(t)] j ^  ^in' ^ 
Now M iii is an inequality. So we have the following conditions, 
(106c) az[b(t), d^/] - K[3(t)] s 0, t=0, 1, ... 
with strict equality for those t, for which^°(t) > 0, 
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(106d) Tl°(t) ^ 0. 
From 106b it appears that if Tl°(t) = 0, then ^ ^(t) = 0, j e 
for a given t, i.e., the firm is not expanding, it is rather decaying 
unless 3 . = 0, for each j e I . Differentiating with respect to state 
o J m 
variables, b^(t), j e t=l, 2, ..., and setting the resulting expressions 
to zero, we get, 
(107) ^ + p '^'VjCt- l )  - pV( t ) ( l - 3 ^ . )  = 0 
j e t = l ,  2 ,  
The balanced growth path, on the other hand, is characterized by 
(assuming that bj does not correspond to a corner point, j e I^) 
^4 j' 
Using 108, the difference equation can be written in the following 
form 
(109) P Yj = PWy(C)(l-9Qj) - M'j(t-l), j el^, t=l, 2, ... . 
The difference equation 109 is autonomous as it does not involve "t" 
explicitly. It can be solved in the following way 
(110) [Xj(t) = p(j,.(t+l)(l-0^j) - py° 
= p(l-3^.)(ftJ-.(t+2)(l- 3 ^ . )  - (V°) - Py°. 
Continuing in this way, ^j(t) can be expressed as a convergent 
geometric series except for the last term which can be neglected 
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since 0 < p <1, and 0 < g . <1. 
oj 
(111) Wy(C) = -py° - p^(l-0^^)y° - p^(l-e^j)^y° "... 
or 
py. 
(Ilia) ix.(t) - p(i_p^_) - 1 • 
It can easily be seen that 111a does not involve t, and the stationary 
solution of ^ j(t), for each t=0, 1, 2, is given by the same 
expression, i.e., 
(112) u, = 
o 
* pyj 
P(l-Boj) - 1 ' 
Equation 111 can be given the same economic interpretation that 
^j(t) was given in the last chapter. Suppose the firm gets a gift 
of one more unit of capital good at the end of the t*"^ period. This would 
generate a flow of productive services of the type of resource, of one 
unit in the t+l'"^ period, of (1-3^^) unit in the t+2^^ period and so on. 
Now on a balanced growth path the marginal revenue productivity of the 
capital good is the same, namely, y°. So the discounted sum of 
the contribution of one more unit of the capital good at the end of the 
th . , . . , t+1 o , t+2,. Q . 0 , t+3,, 0 .2 o 
t period IS given by p y^ + p (l-Pgj)yj + p (l-p^j) y^ + 
and since one unit of revenue at t=0 is equivalent to 1/p^ unit in the 
t^^ period the current evaluation of the gift is 
py" + P^(l-9Qj)yj + •.. • 
|i^(t) is therefore the opportunity cost of foregoing such a gift. If 
wc make 0^^ = 0, then we get ^^(t) = y°. Hence, the current 
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evaluation of such a gift in the t+l*"^ period from which it can be used 
o 
y, 
, where p-1 is the rate of discount. 
p-1 
Using Ilia and 106 b we get, 
p y° 
(^^3) Kj[3(t)].[p(l-3^^)-l] " j e t-0, 1, 2, ... . 
If ~ j G then 113 shows that on a balanced growth 
path the marginal cost of expansion of the resource is proportional 
to its marginal revenue productivity. Moreover, assuming Kj[0(t)] ^  0 
and T;(t) p 0, (i.e., the firm is expanding and any capital good is not 
free) we can see that y° cannot be zero for any resource. Hence, 
all resources must be fully utilized on a balanced growth path. 
Certain features of this balanced growth path appear only when 
we consider a linear programming model, i.e., we let d tend to 
infinity in Q. 
The maximization problem before the firm is now, 
max Z (p.- u.)q. = Zc.q. = z 
i=l ^ ^ ^ i=l ^ ^ 
(LP) 
Subject to Z a..q. ^ b., jel, q. ^0, iel. 
j J ^  ^ J mi n 
In the matrix-vector notation we used before, LP can be written as 
max c'q = z 
q 
subject to Aq ^ b 
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We assume that : 
(1) is nonnegative, j e i e (i.e., A ^  0) and is 
positive for some i e for any given j, j e 
(2) b > 0, je I^, i.e., b > 0. 
We have shovn that if 1 holds and b ^  0 then an optimal q° exists 
(see Chapter V). This is because both LP and its dual are then 
feasible. But if b^ = 0 for some j, then the only feasible point 
in LP might be q = 0 . In fact if a^^ is positive for some j for 
each i, i e then the only feasible point in LP is q = 0 if b^ = 0. 
But if a.. =0 for some j for each iel then the resource is not ji n 
required by any output program and the constraint associated with it 
can be dropped, since it is redundant. We now, therefore, assume b ^ 0, 
hoping that this would make some q ^ 0 optimal for LP. 
Let b be changed to b =\b in LP, X >1. Then it can be shown that 
q° will increase to'q° = >q° and z to z = Xz. (In fact this will hold 
f o r  a n y  I  > 0 . )  
PROOF The dual to LP before the change in "b" vector was: 
min Z b.y. 
j ^ ^ 
(D) i 1 
yj Ï 0, j c i„. 
' ^ ^ 0 0  ' ^ 0  
As b is changed to b, q = Xq is feasible for LP (b) and y is feasible 
'*^ 0 0 0 o 
for D (b). Furthermore, b'y = (Xb)'y = Xb'y = \z = Xc'q = c'q . 
So q° must be optimal for LP (b). Note that if q° were the unique optimum in 
~o 
LP(b) then q would be the unique optimum in LP(b). 
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We assume that K[3(t)] is positive homogeneous in B^(t), Pgft), •••> 
P (t). Now on a balanced growth path, 
(114) b . ( t + l )  =  X b . ( t )  =  b . ( t ) ( l - 3 ^ . )  +  3 . ( t ) ,  j e 
t=0, 1, 
where X>1;O<0 .<1, jei. 
o j m 
Now 114 holds only if Pj(t) M 0, j e l^, i.e., the firm is an 
expanding firm. We have seen that for such a firm^j(t) ^  0, j e 
and Tl, (t) > 0. t=0, 1, .... So M iii will hold with equality. 
In the linear programming situation, when K(3(t)) is positive 
homogenous and 0 . = 0 for each i e I , it can be shown that once 
° oj o m 
the equality in M iii is forced the objective function plays no 
further role and the rate of growth of the firm is uniquely determined 
for any given initial vector b(o). 
PROOF From 114 and setting P . = 3 , j e I 
oj 0 m 
3  .(C) = Ç V - H 3  )b.(t), j e I , t=0, 1, ... 
J 0 J m 
K [ 3  ( t ) ]  =  K [ 3 ^ ( t ) ,  p ^ C t ) ,  GG^(T)]  
= K [(X-1-+3 ^ )bj^(t) , (?i-n3 ^)b2(t), ..., ( \-l+3Q)bju(t)] 
= (^-1+3^) K[b(t)] = (X-l+3^)-K[xS(o)] 
= X^XX-l4Bo)K[b(o)] 
Similarly, z[ b(t)] =^^z[b(o)]. 
Hence from 105a we obtain that if T](t) -i o, 
aÀ^z[b(o)] =X^[X-l-<3o] K[b(o)] . 
Hence, 
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So once b(o) is given, z[ b(o)] and hence A. are uniquely determined. We 
now establish a simple lemma: 
2 
LEMMA 1 Let b'(o) = Ofb (o), where Q? > 0, is a scalar: 
2 
and let ^[b'(o)]and X[b (o)] be the associated growth rates. Then 
\[b' (o)] = Â.[b^(o)] . 
PROOF Ub'(o)l. ^^jbHoj] + 1-9 
8z[ctb^ (o)] ^  
ÔK[(yb^o)] ° 
(0)1 + 1-3 = X[b^o)] 
ÔK[b^(o)] 
The above lemma shows that \ depends only on the proportionings of kyfo), 
2 j e Now if the firm is given a choice between b'(o) and b (o) it 
2 
would always choose b'(o), if a >1 and b (o), if a<l and would be 
indifferent only if o= 1. This can easily be seen from the objective 
function in M i. However, the choice of b(o), at the initial period 
is not costless. In M i, this cost does not appear since the firm 
starts with b(o) (completely amortized). Moreover this cost changes 
by a scalar rate as b(o) increases by a scalar rate and z[b(o]j also 
increases by the same scalar rate. 
So far we have taken for granted that the maximum in M i exists. 
In our quadratic model Q, it appears that since d(t) is growing at a 
rate less than 1/p, the uniform dampening factor provided by p would be 
sufficient to make the infinite series in M i converge as z(t) grows 
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over time. To be definite let us consider a balanced growth path. Then 
CO 
z(t) = z(o)^^ and Z p^z(t) = • 
t=0 
Such a way of escape does not exist for our linear model since d = 
+ CD, Hence as z(t) grows over time (on a balanced or unbalanced growth 
path) the infinite series in M i may not be convergent. We may, 
however, use the "overtaking" principle (Gal^ 196%) for a comparison of 
infinite programs. Let 7} be a feasible program generating z^(o), 
2 2 2 2 
z (1); ... . Let Z be another such program which generates z ( 0 ) ,  z (1), 
... . Now Q' can be considered "inefficient" in comparison to Z^ if 
there exists a value t, such that the following inequality holds: 
*• T 1 T 2 (115) Z P'z\t) s Zp Z^T), 
T=0 T=0 
"ïV Yf * * 
for all values of t ^ t , i.e., t=t , t +1, t +2, ..... For balanced 
growth paths the above principle reduces to a simple rule, namely 
12 1 
if ). > \ , then the growth path at the rate \ is "efficient" in 
2 
comparison with the growth path at the rate \ , whatever may be the 
1 2 
initial value of z(o). Since \  > X  > 1 ,  t h e  h i g h e r  o r d e r  t e r m s  
in will dominate the relation 115. 
We now reformulate our linear model. We assume that it is required 
by law that the firm has to grow on a balanced growth (or golden age) 
path. But the firm has the option, at t=0, of choosing any initial 
capital outfit b(o) subject to a budget constraint. We shall later 
remove the budget constraint to see how our results are affected thereby. 
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The problem before the firm is 
max\[bj^(o), b^Co), b^(o)] = 
(G) 
where \[h(o)] =''^[^(0)] + ^ "^o 
subject to K[b(o)] ^  I 
bj ^  0, j=l, 2, ..., m. 
For simplicity we now drop the arguments of the functions z, K, We 
shall write y. for and K. for , j e I . 
J obj(o) J obj(o) m 
The Lagrangian is 
(116) L = + 1- 3  +  l l (I-K) 
Assuming internal maximization with respect to b^ so that b^ > 0 and 
differentiability of z and K with respect to b^, j e and other 
regularity conditions as required, 
P) Cy.K - K.az 
(117) ^ ^ 2 •" = 0. i e I -
j K- : 
Moreover we have 
(118) I - K s 0 
with equality for Tj > 0 and ^ ^  0. 
From 117 we get multiplying throughout by , 
j 
' I + ! K, j c !.. 
J 
Two cases need to be considered: 
124 
y ^ 
(119a) T] > 0. Then I = K and 119 become i G I 
m 
J 
or 
Y; z 
(119b) T, = 0 and ^  , j e 
j 
Now the choice of b(o) will determine b(t) for any subsequent period 
on a balanced growth path. This has the following implication: 
(120) K.[3(t)] = K , j e I^, t=0, 1, 2, ... . 
PROOF 9j(k) = ^ ^(&-l43p)bj(o) 
- Kj- i : ^ 
Equation 120 shows that since K[3 (t)] is positive homogeneous in3^(t), 
j e at any time t the marginal cost of expansion would be equal to the 
average cost of expansion of capacity of the good so long asBj(t) 
is growing by the same rate X over time for t=0, 1, ..., je That 
0j(t) would grow by X can be seen from the following relation: 
(121) p.(t+l) (X-l-tp^)b.(o) = X;.(t), j e 
t=0, 1, ... 
It may be noted that in deriving 119 from 117, we multiplied throughout 
by K/K^T . If bj > 0 for all j e I^, > 0 (since it is positive 
homogeneous) and since a > 0, such a multiplication is permissible. 
Moreover, K > 0 for any nontrivial situation. 
Let us now consider the situation when there is no budget constraint. 
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It can easily be seen that in that case 119b holds. This can be checked 
either directly (i.e., dropping the constraint in G) or by letting I 
tend to infinite so that I-K>0 will hold and hence T) will be zero. Now 
the relation 119b gives m-1 independent equations. 
2 
PROOF Suppose ^  =-, for j=l, 2, ..., m-1 
j 
y ^ 
we have to show that — = — . 
m 
b;?; Z 
S ince b. > 0, je I , T—nr" = % , j=l, 2, ..., m-1. Hence 
m-1 J bjK. K 
= —. But K = Z K.b., because of positive homogeneity of K, 
j=l z 
m-1 K" , j j 
for which Eulers' theorem will hold. Moreover, by the assumption of the 
differentiability of z with respect to b^, je I^, y^ is the optimum 
value of the dual variable that corresponds to the j^^ resource constraint, 
m 
j el and z(o) = Z b.(o)y.. 
™ j=l J J 
So if there is no budget constraint, there is no unique solution 
for bj, j=l, 2, m though the optimum \ is uniquely determined, 
as suggested by Lemma 1. In other words b (o) will be determined 
unique only up to a multiplicative positive constant and for each 
such b (o), \ would be the same, i.e., 
(122) ,* .c 4 + 1.8 . 
K[b (0)1 ° 
Another thing that is to be noted is 119b does not involve &, though 
\ ' will be an increasing function of a(and a decreasing function of 
3 ^ ), as can be seen from 122. 
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Let us now consider the case when the budget constraint exists. 
Equation 119 can also be written as 
K, K K K i / m 
y, 
Equation 123 follows from the fact that is equal to a given constant 
for each j eand hence must be equal to z/K since both z and K are 
positive homogeneous in b^, j e as it has been shown before. 
If the budget is not fully utilized, we have T| = 0 and 119b holds 
once again but with an additional condition K < I. If the budget is fully 
utilized we have K = I. Even then 119b holds and the indeterrainancy dis­
appears. So the optimal conditions can be written in a form that does 
not involve a, namely 
• • •  ° K ® " t  
I z m 
(124b) I = K. 
If \ > 0, T' can be given any of the following interpretations. 
1. Since ^  we have = T^, but az[b(o)] = K [3(O ) ]  .  
K. C7 K 
Hence T] = §§{§}|/K[b(o)] = X'-l+S^. 
2. Tl, - , i.e., the marginal contribution of one more unit 
of investment fund to the optimal rate of growth, other 
things in the system remaining the same. 
J=1 J 
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* 
Moreover, since T] > 0, I = K and 
_ * 
ôb.(o) 
1 = ; MMoU . ni 
. n X 01 j=0 ôbj(o) 
m %,,r, *, . T Sb . (o) 
Hence f = f Z MMsH . 
j=0 ôbj(o) 
Hence 
j=0 3bj(o) clbj(o) 
" ÔL 
Since the bracketed expression is Z -rr—r evaluated at b (o) and 
Il . 
Now the right-hand side of 119 is positive, must be positive 
for any j for which b^ (and hence K^) is positive. By the assumption 
of differentiability of z(b), y^ = y° = y^Ct) in G for t=0, 1, ..., 
since on a balanced growth path y°(t) will remain the same for any 
value of t. BuL in Lhe linear program L F, q°(L) may not be uniquely 
determined, as it would be in Q. However, Goldman and Tucker (1956) 
have shown that if both LP and D are feasible (as they are) then 
for any j, j e I j the following alternatives will hold:^ 
n 
1. either 2 a..q. <b, for some optimal q and y. = 0 for every 
i=l ^ J J 
optimal y°; 
With appropriate changes in notation, this is Corollary 2B on 
page 62, Goldman and Tucker (1956). 
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n 
2 .  o r  2 a . . q .  = b. for every optimal q and y. >0 for some 
i=l ^ J j 
optimal y°, j e 
By the assumption of differentiability of z with respect to b^, j e 
y° will be uniquely determined in G. So the above result shows since 
y° > 0, i e I , all resources j e I would be fully utilized for any 
J m m 
choice of q°. Furthermore, on a balanced growth path the same goods 
will be produced for each t=0, 1, ... . However, at t=0, q°(o) may 
not be uniquely determined. But we can tell what goods will not be 
produced and what goods may be produced at a positive level by the 
following rule: 
^ T a..y° for some i, then that good will 
(125a) If Pi - ] 
not be produced. 
(125b) Only those goods may be produced for some choice of 
m 
q (o) for which p .  - u. = Z a..y.. 
^ ^ j=l J 
From 120, K [3(t)] =K.[b,(o)], j e I , t=Q, 1, ... . Since y°(t) = 
j J J ^ J 
yj, the following relation will hold for each t , t=0, 1, ... on a 
balanced growth path once b (o) is optimally determined. 
Moreover K[3(t)] = (x -1"+^^) K[b*(o)] and az[b (o)] = K[0(t)], 
Hence 
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K.[g(t)l • KtP(^)] • 
j e t=0, 1, ... 
Hence, on a balanced growth path the marginal revenue productivity of the 
resource would be proportional to the marginal (and average) cost 
of expansion of the capacity of the resource. Equation 127 therefore 
gives the firm's "expansion path" over time. 
From 125b and 126 we deduce that for any good, i, i e that 
is produced at a positive level, we must have 
; t=0, 1, ..., 
(129)  o 
• Krb*(o)l 
2  a  K J D  l o j j  
1=1 J J 
Once again it can be shown that 
* ^ o o 
z[b (o)] = 7. q. (p. - u ) = z q. (p. " u ) 
i=l isl^ 
q°>0 
and 
K[ b (o)] = Z b (o) K [b (o)] = Z Z a q K.[b (o)] 
j=l J J i=l j=l ^ ^ 
130 
" o * 
= 2 Z a q Kjb (o)]. 
iel^ j=l ^ J 
q^>0 
i f  
So far we have assumed that = y°, j e I . But z may 
Sbj(o) ^ ™ 
not be differentiable with respect to bj(o) at a corner point (i.e., 
overdetermined point) and the above partial derivative with respect 
to b. may not exist, i 0 I . 
J m 
In that case we have the more general rule, for an optimal choice 
of bj(o), j e 
(130) + 
ôb.(o) - ^ K[b (o)] ^ a b j (o)  / -
K.[b*(o)] , I - K 2 0 ,  ? 2  0,  T] ( I -K)  =  0 .  
Now y° is not uniquely determined. But by Goldman and Tucker's result 
we know that if y° > 0, je for some optimal y^,then the j'"" resource 
will be fully utilized. Moreover it can be shown that y° > 0 for some 
choice of y° if and only if (" ^£Lk_l£2l ) j^g positive for a given j e T . 
ôb.(o) 
PROOF As regards the "only if" part we note that 
o ^ az[b*(o)]^ 
J 
Hence if for any y°, y° > 0, then 
* 
( ^ ô z b ( o ) ,  ,  . .  
^ ^ J must be positive. 
^ " k  
Sbj(o) 
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As regards the "if" part we use another result of Goldman and 
Tucker, which states that if an optimal q° exists then there exist 
some q° and y° such that 
(y°) + (b-Aq) >0.1 
Now let us assume that y° = 0 for every optimal y°. Then there 
exists some q° for which 
"j -
Hence if we reduce b^ and produce q° as before, z(q ) will not change. 
Hence 
• k  
Ô bj(o) 
must be zero. Hence if the left-hand derivative is positive, y° 
must be positive for some y°. 
We now illustrate the maximal balanced growth path of a firm with 
two processes, each process producing one product and utilizing two 
resources. The intensity of each process is measured by the amount 
of output produced. The firm has a given technology. The technological 
information about the firm is summarized by the following 2x2 matrix 
^11 ^12 ^  L l
A = ap « ; 
^21 *22 
^This is lemma 4 on page 59, Goldman and Tucker (1956) 
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where indicates the technically determined utilization rate (the 
amount of service-flow consumed) of the resource by the i^^ process at 
the unit level of intensity, i.e., for producing one unit of the i*"^ good, 
1=1, 2; j=l, 2. 
^i ~ ^ i ' "i' the net return per unit of the i^^ good, or 
the price of the i^^ good, p^, net of variable costs per unit of the i^^ good, 
u.,i=l,2. We assume that c^ is given to the firm, i=l, 2. 
We now introduce two other "processes" by the following slack 
vectors, 
0 -
^3 = Cl = *4 = =2 =Cl) 
They correspond to keeping unutilized one unit of the resource, j=l,2. 
We set c^ = = 0, i.e., such processes are costless. 
The maximization problem before the firm in t*"^ period is 
max c^q^(t) + Cg^gft) = ^(t) 
(*) 
aibject to a^^q^(t) + = b^(t) 
+ aggAgCc) + q/,(t) = b2(t) 
q^^)2 0, i=l, 2, 3, 4, 
where bj(t) is the total availability of the services of the resource 
t^^ period and q^Ct), q^(t) are the intensities of the processes a^ and 
a^ in t^^ period; q^(t) is the amount of the i*"^ output produced, i=l,2; 
t=0, 1, 2, ... . 
We make the following assumptions: 
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al. a^. >0, 1=1, 2; j=l, 2, 
a2. is positive, i.e., p^ > i=l, 2, 
a3. I A 1 r 0, i.e., A is of full rank. 
Assumptions al implies that for any feasible solution for which not both 
q^(t) and q^ft) are zero, we require that b^(t) and bgCt) are positive. 
Moreover, the resources are nonspecific, i.e., they can be used for 
either in the production of q^(t) or qgft) and both the resources are 
required for producing any product in positive amounts. The production 
functions (in the conditional form) of the firm are: 
Since by a3, | A | = 0, we can make | A | positive without any loss 
of generality. For instance if | A | is negative to start with we 
switch the numbering of the first two processes and thus making one 
"inversion" in the associated technological matrix. 
will exist as we have seen before. So a basis optimal solution will 
also exist. Since there are four vectors, a basic can be chosen 
in six possible ways. Let us number them and state the conditions 
of their feasibility and optimality. 
mm 
(131) 
min 
Suppose b^(t) > 0 and b2(t) > 0 are given. Then an optimal q 
o 
BI  =  A  =  (A I ,  A^ ) ;  1 A  I  >  0  
is feasible if 
134 
with at least one inequality strict. 
It is also optimal if 
(132b) 
*21 =1 *11 
with at least one inequality strict 
Bg = (a^, a^) = (a^, e^);| 
is feasible if 
*22 . *21 ^2^^) 
(133a) -^ > 2: 
*12 *11 bi(C) 
and also optimal if 
(133b) — — 
*21 =1 
®3 (a^: a^) (a^, 02^ ' i®3 i 
is feasible if 
^2^^) ^21 
' if; 
and also optimal if 
*22 *12 ^2 (134b) — > — > — 
*21 *11 ^1 
135 
"  ( * 2 '  ^ 3 ^  "  ( * 2 '  e ^ ) ;  1  1  =  <  0  
is feasible if 
=22 , 
<"5») ^ ^ 
and also optimal if 
(135b) :2 . > flZ 
""l ^21 ^11 
B5 = (Sg, a^) = (*2' eg); I Bgl = > ° 
is feasible if 
and also optimal if 
^ 2  ^12 (136b) — > — 
^1 ^11 
Be = (*3' *4) = I 
is feasible but never optimal, 
PROOF First of all let us indicate why cannot be an 
optimal basis. By simplex criterion, = c^ B ^a^ 
cj i 0, j=l, 2, 3, 4, for an optimal basis, where c^ 
IS the truncated c = c^, c^, c^, c^j" vector that 
corresponds to the basis variables and a^, any vector, 
j=l, 2, 3, 4. Since = 0 for the basis vector, we 
136 
only check whether Aj^O for the nonbasis vectors. For 
B^, = -c^ and = -c^, where both a^ and a^ are 
not in the basis. Hence the optimality criterion is 
not satisfied. 
_i 
We now prove 132a and 132b. If is feasible then q(t) = B^ b(t) 
where q(t) = q^(t), q^ft) and b(t) = |b^(t), bgCt)} . By > 0 
Cramer's rule 
q^ft) = 
bi(t) 
bjCt) =22 / 1 A 
and 
qgft) = "u 
'21 ''2'" 
/ 1 A I . 
If 132a holds all the determinants are positive, since | A | is positive 
by hypothesis. B^ is optimal if Ag - 0 and A^ ^  0. Hence we 
require that 
[c^, c^] B^^a^ - Cj ^  0, j=3, 4. 
Since c^ = = 0, we should have the following determinants 
nonnegative: 
^21 ^22 
^11 ^12 
o ^1^22'^2^21 
This is guaranteed by 132b. Note that in this case y^ = 
*2 = —m— 
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To prove 133a and 134b we note that 
«2 • ('l' 'l': I =2 I • -1'»21 
qi(t) = bg/agi > 0. 
Hence, is feasible if 
q^fc) - 0> i.e., if 
>11 b^(t) 
"21 ''2<'> 
is nonpositive, i.e., if 133a holds. 
4^ = C2/*21 > 0 
Hence, is also optimal if is nonnegative, i.e., 
^2 = - I 
21 I *21 *22 
12 
22 
^1*22 
21 
Cg ^ 0 
Hence ^ 0 if 133b holds. 
Similar proofs can be given for the relations 134a - 136b. We 
now replace a3 by a more restrictive assumption. 
a4. Any 2x2 submatrix of 
\ 
^11 *12 
\*21 22 
if of full rank. 
Note that if a4 holds |A | = 0, so we can make it positive once again. 
Assumption a4 also implies that the following determinants are nonzero, 
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^11 ^12 
"l '2 
^21 *22 
Let 
(137) f22^fl2^_^ 
*21 *11 '^l 
Only and can be optimal if they are feasible. In both cases q^(t) 
is in the optimal basis, and q2(t) would not enter the basis because is 
positive for both and as basis. With B2 as basis = 0, = ——. 
Ci h ^ i o )  a^^ 
With B„ as basis A = , A =0. Hence at t=0, let . 
3 3 4 b^(o) a^^ 
So that both B^ and B^ are simultaneously feasible and q^C^) ~ q^(t) = 0. 
At this point 
c 
r a: ^ =_JL . r 
V Bb, (o)y- a,, ' v, 
(138) 
ÔZ 
ô ^ ^^ V ôb^(o)y+ 
( -2L_1 = _i_ . f oz ^ ^  
V ab_(o)V- a_. ' V ab.(o)V+ 
2\ 21 " "2' 
Equation 138 follows from the fact that any slight increase (decrease) 
in b^(o) would make BgCB^) the only optimal basis and a similar slight 
increase (decrease) in bg/o) would make Bg(B2) the only optimal basis. 
We now show that when 137 holds, the maximal balanced growth path is 
given by 
2^^ ^^  *21 (139) ^, t=0, 1, 2, ... . 
b^(t) *11 
139 
PROOF From the optimality rule 130 we check to see 
At bj/bj » 
c^b^(o) C b^(o) 
z[b(o)l ^ ^ 
^11 ^21 
^21 
K[b(o)] = K^b^(o) + Kg — b^(o) 
"21 kl(°) 
- [•'l + "^ 2 T"! bi(°) - tKi*!! + V21I" 
'11 " ^ ^11 
Hence 140 is satisfied since and are positive. 
It may be noted that when 137 holds, the problem Z is not much 
different from the maximization problem of a single-product firm 
producing with two limitational factors and subject to the following 
production function, a simple minimum law (Frisch, 1965), obtained from 
131 by setting q2(t) = 0, 
. b (t) b (t) 
(131a) q^(t) = min — , — J ; t=0, 1, 2, ... . 
11 21 
bg/C) 
It can easily be checked that on the limitational line; ^  = 
 ^ J:- !^ -^o 
\ôb^(t)y- a^^'Vôb^(t)A V abg(t)J. ^21 '^Sbg(l:)J+ ' 
Hcncc 138 will hold. So both b^(t) and b^Ct) are limitational, any 
140 
increase in one of the factors, without a corresponding increase in 
the other will contribute nothing to z(t). Hence the solution 139 is 
stable. 
A similar analysis can be made for the case when 
(141) — < — < — . 
^21 ^12 ""l 
Now only and could be optimal. Only qgft) is produced. On 
the maximal balanced growth path 
^22 (142) ; t=0, 1, 2, ... 
b^(t) 12 
i.e., and are simultaneously feasible. 
V Bbg(o)y- 22 \ Bbg(o)/+ 
and the optimaiity conditions are satisfied at 142, since, 
^2 ^2 ^ ^2 ^ ^2 ^ 
*1^12 ^1^12 *2*22 *2*22 *1*12 *2*22 
Once again the solution is stable. 
The production function is 
.b^(C) bgft). 
(131b) q (t) = min ( — , — J . 
12 22 
It may be noted that both 139 and 142 do not involve K function. If 
a given budget is given then we should have, I = K^a^2 + ^2*22' So an 
141 
unique pair b*(o), h^{o) and a growth path will be determined. We now 
consider the situation when, 
(145) — > — > — 
^21 "^1 ^11 
Now and B^ can be optimal. Only is optimal if 
(146) 
12 b^(o) 11 
B^ and are both optimal if 
(147) = 
bl(o) 
^22 ^21 
and B, and B„ are both optimal if > = —^ . 
^12 ^11 b^(o) 
The maximal balanced growth path now depends essentially on the K function. 
If 146 holds, then z[l)(o)] is differentiable and 
(148) ^ ^  = 4 b(o)l ^ 
K, K[b(o)] a 
=1*22 - Cga?! %! 
i.e., =— , given a budget I so that K[ b(o)] = I, an 
=2*11 " =1*12 ^2 
unique maximal balanced growth path will be determined. Moreover, on 
this maximal balanced growth path 
c c À*-l+0 
(149) 1 — 
^1*11 *2*21 ^^1*12 ^2*22 • 
If 147 holds then and are both optimal. If b^ increases 
(decreases) by one unit B^(B^) is the only optimal basis and similarly 
if increases (decreases) by one unit B^(B^) is the only optimal basis. 
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Now z(b(t)) if we calculate it from However, if we 
^12 ^ 
calculate it from B^ we get the same value. 
PROOF z(b(t)) = y^b^(t) + ygbgft) 
= y.^b^(t) + y2 ^  
Moreover, 
(150) 
b^(t) 
^1*22 " ^2^21 ^^2^11 " ^1*12 
= m ' ^2 = 
^1*12*22 " ^^*21*12 
-2*11*22 " ^ 1*12*22 
Hence, z(b(t))= — • ^ 
*12 
b^(t) 
c. 
*12 2 *12 
Sz \ ^2 / Az \ ^1*22 ' ^2*21 
V 8b J- a^2 ' ^âb^Vf a, ,a„„ - a, „a 11 22 12 21 
0^' =2*11 - =1*12 ^ 0. 
h J. \i^ 22 ' *12*22 ' ^^2^+ 
^2 
Since A = y ; A = y when is the optimal basis and A~ ; A, = 0 
-) i. 4 Z 1 J 2 
when B^ is the optimal basis, 
K[b(o)] = K^b^(o) + KgbgCo) 
b (o) 
" ~a~ f *1*12 2^*22 Î 
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Hence 
z [  b(o)1 l2_ 
K[b(o)] '^1^12 •*" ^2^22 
So 147 will hold only if 
(151) ^ V22-V21 
^1^12 ^1*12 *2*22 K^(*ll*22 " ^ 12^21^ 
'2*11 • '1*12 ^ 22 ^ 0. 
*1(^11^22 ' ^12^21^ ^^1^12 •*" ^2*22 
If 148 holds then and can be optimal basis. If b^ increases 
(decreases) by one unit BgXB^) is the only optimal basis and vice versa. 
By a similar process of reasoning it can be shown that 
c,b (t) 
(152) z(b(t)) =-^ 
*21 
b.Co) 
(153) KI b(o)] = — ' [ 
C-) %>). = 
( ' ° 
.2i-
^ b^(oy_ a^^ 
r  à z  \  _ =2*11 ' =1*12 
\3 b2(o)/+ |X] 
Hence 147 will hold only if 
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(155) 
*^1^22 " ^2^21 
^1^^11®22 " *12*2l) ^1*11 •*• ^2*21 
a 0 
*2*21 ^1^11 *2*21 
^^2*11 " ^1*12 
*2^*11^22 " *12*2l) 
To complete our analysis we note 
2^(0) *22 *12 
1. If CO > . , . > > then when 145 holds, 
bi(o) »u 
only Bj is optimal. Hence ("j^^ - g 
So will be increased and b^ decreased till 
^22 ^12 
T-V- = — > , i.e. , 147 holds. 
bjCo) «12 
^22 ^12 ^*2^°) 
2. If —> — , • > 0 and 145 holds, only B„ is 
*12 *11 bl(°) 2 
optimal and hence ; (jf^) = 0. Hence 
b^(u) will be decreased and/or increased till we hit 
^22 ^12 ^2^°^ 
— >— = when 148 holds. 
"12 "11 bl(°) 
It may be noted that when 145 holds the firm is essentially a 
two-product firm for which 131 applies. When 146 holds, both b^(t) 
and b^Ct) have positive marginal revenue productivities both in the 
foreward and backward directions. Any change in b^(t) or bgfc) alone 
can be accommodated by changing the relative production levels of 
145 
q^(t) and qgXc)- However, when 147 or 148 holds the firm is on a 
corner point, i.e., on a knife-edge balance. But even here the option 
of introducing another product in its production schedule makes the 
marginal revenue productivity of the more strategic factor positive, 
even in the foreward direction (see 150 and 154). However, it may 
be noted that the marginal productivity of any particular factor for 
producing one particular product, keeping the other product at a 
constant amount is still zero on the maximal balanced growth path, 
for more than one factor is needed for producing any output and 
there cannot be any excess capacity of any factor on this particular 
path. So it is the degree of assortment of two products that gives 
the firm one extra degree of freedom. 
We now relax a4 and assume once again |A|  >  0 .  Let 
B- arid R can now be optimal if any of them is feasible 
The feasibility will however depend on 
We start from a situation when 
22 ^21 
B and R can be feasible. For R_ as the basis. A _ =  —^ ^  =  0 .  
2 1 
For Br as the basis, A „ = and A, =0. Hence 
5  3  A ^ _  A  4  
146 
when 156 holds. Hence b^(o) (bg/o)) would be increased (decreased) till 
^22 
,—7—V . Now B., B, and B, are feasible. But with B, as the basis 
b^(o) a^2 3 5 1 1 
^ = ^1*22 " ^ 2^21 ^ 2l_ 
^ *11*22 " *12*21 *11 
A, , VU1II!12_, „ 
*11*22 ' *12*21 
So 157 continues to hold and the adjustment process continues till we 
reach 
( 158 )  
^ 2 * ° )  ' 2 1  
bj(o) " 
At this point B^ and are both optimal. 
If wp start from the other end. namely 
*22 *21 '^2(°) 
^1 
we see that only B is optimal and since ZL = 0, A = 
2 ^ ^ *21 
d z  „  d z  ^ 1  
Sbjiô) ' -syïï)-^ 
if 159 holds. So b- (b ) would be increased (decreased) until we 
' n  
^ ' 7^-
147 
We now claim that the unique minimal balanced growth path is given by 
bgft) ^21 
bjtl • 7^  • 1 
PROOF When 161 holds C ôb^ )+ = 
f ÔZ ^ ^1 C 'àz _ n 
- IT:: l/SbTTZT/L - 0-
z[b(o)] = and 
11 21 12 
K[b(o)] = K^b^ + Kgb^ = — + Kga^^] 
Hence 
(162) 
^1*11 ^1^11 ^2*21 
> 0 
^2*21 ^1^11 *^*21 
> 0 . 
Once again the solution is stable and does not depend on K essentially, 
except for the fact that K^, are assumed to be strictly positive. 
Similar analysis can be made when 
(163) "l '2 
^21 ^22 
=2 _ *2 ^12 
— 0 or —— — — > — 
^1 ^21 ^11 
^1' ^ 2' ^ 4' possible optimal basis. 
When 156 holds is optimal, hence 
148 
/ic/\ 5z ^2 ôz n 
ôb^(o) ' ôb^Co) 
So b^(o) (bg/o)) is increased (decreased) till we hit 
when and are both feasible. 
Starting at the other end where 159 holds, we see that and 
are feasible. Hence 
^22 ^21 
So b, (b„) would be increased (decreased) until, > = -—7—^ . 
12 *12 'U bl(°) 
Now B^ becomes feasible but once again, with as the basis 
166 continues to hold and hence the adjustment process stops at the 
point where 165 holds. Since B^ and B^ are now both optimal, we 
have at this point 
° ^  ° '4 ° ° ' 
2[b(0)] = • 
^12 ^21 ^22 
K( b(o)] - [ K^a^2 + ^ 2*2^' 
149 
2^(0) *22 
Hence the optimality conditions are satisfied at —r = ; 
b^(o) *12 
= 2 =2 
. .. . > 0 . 
^2*22 ^1^12 *2*22 
Once again the solution is stable and does not depend on the K function 
essentially. 
Lastly, we consider the situation when A is singular, i.e. [ A | = 0. 
le: >0. 
=11 '21 
Cp r b. 
(169) If — < k, then q, = min 
^1 ^ ^11 ' *21-
qg = 0. 
r\ 'z 1. 
(170) If >k, then q° = 0, q° = min [" -^1 • 
i z L *22^ 
i< * 
b,(o) b (o) 
If 169 holds = . If 170 holds then 
*11 *21 
11 
PROOF If 169 holds, z[b(o] = 
b*(o) 
* 
*12 ^22 
b2(o) 
*11 *21 
f 5 z _ ^1 f Ô z „ . 
Vôbj^(o>/'- ' \ôb^(oy+ ' 
C f S z ^ . 
Vabg(o)y- Vôb,(o)y+ 
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b,(o) 
K[b^(o), b^Co)] " 
Hence the optimality rule 
< „  < 0  
(172) 
*1^11 *1^11 *2*21 
^ "=1 
< ^7— , „ „—< 0 holds, 
^2^21 ^1*11 *2*21 
Similarly, if 170 holds, 
c.b^fo) CgbgCo) 
z[b(o)] = 
*12 *22 
^ * h*(o) 
(174) K[b^(o), b2(o)] =-^ t + V22^ 
^ 2  ^ 2  
Hence the optimality rule < —r < 0; 
*1*12 *1*12 *2*22 
S 
Lastly if — = k then the firm is in effectproducing one product, 
*^ 1 
i.e., the products are economically as well as technically equivalent 
and no unique solution will exist. Wc now compare the optimal capacity 
expansion path of the last chapter with the balanced growth of this chapter, 
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In the specialized model that we considered in the last chapter 
no transfer of investible funds over time was allowed. The firm 
starts with an initial resource vector b(o) and chooses P (t) and 
a(t) optimally over time so that a preference functional over time 
is maximized. Since the preference functional considered is additive 
such a growth path satisfies the "optimality" principle. Suppose 
the firm has chosen an optimal program, completely spelled out at 
t=0. The decision vectors 3(t) and a(t) as chosen optimally over 
time will determine b(t) over time. Suppose by following this 
path the firm ends up with b(t^) at time t=t^. Define 
T 
t v(t ) = Z P(T )  W[C(T)] + p(T) S[b(T ) ]  .  
^=tl 
Suppose the firm maximizes t^v(t^) from the t^^ period onwards with an 
initial resource vector b(t^) and subject to the same constraints 
of the system as before. Then the optimal path of the original problem 
will coincide with the optimal time path of the truncated problem over 
t^ to T, i.e., the segment of time the programs share in common. Hence 
what happened in the past from t=0 to t=t^ will affect future, t^ to T 
only through b(t^), the state variable at t=t^: Under such conditions 
as we have seen the efficiency prices associated with any capital good 
at time t will depand essentially on behavior of the system (i.e., 
state and control variables and the exogeneous variable, d(t)) from the 
t^^ period onwards. If the efficiency prices are known, the over-
period optimization problem can be converted into an equivalent 
one-period (long-run) problem. 
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All these apply mutatis mutandis to our more general optimal 
capacity expansion policy model where intertemporal transfer of funds 
is allowed. Only thing that we have to include is I(t), the investible 
fund at time t as another state variable. In both cases the efficiency 
prices arc constantly adjusted over time, so that the firm can be 
viewed as growing on an unbalanced growth path though the future is 
known beforehand. 
A simplified version of such an optimal capacity expansion policy 
model has been presented in this chapter. It has been shown that if 
certain conditions are fulfilled then a balanced growth path will exist 
where the efficiency prices remain stationary over time, since the 
firm is changing only in scale, so to say. 
Lastly, we consider the maximal balanced growth path of a firm 
under certain simplifying assumptions. The decision variable now is 
the initial resource vector that the firm should choose at t=0. Once 
that is chosen, the firm is triggered on a particular balanced growth 
path over time forever by the rules of the game. 
Somewhat in between such a balanced and highly unbalanced growth 
paths there can be a quasi-balanced growth path, i.e., when Che 
growth path of the firm has a regeneration property. In a linear 
programming situation suppose the "b" vector after some point of 
time became proportional to b(t^) at t=t^. From t^, the firm will then 
grow in the same way until "b" becomes proportional to b(t^) again. 
During any such cycle, the firm will switch its basis and/or investment 
policy. The growth path of the firm can be described by a periodic 
function of time. 
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One possible situation in which that can happen is when there are 
economies of scale so that building ahead of demand becomes profitable. 
However, such a constant-cycle policy model is not easy to handle in 
the context of a multi-product firm. 
We have assumed a convex k function which makes such economies of 
scale nonexistent. With the device, the problem remains within the 
context of a concave programming problem. It may be noted that all 
the bracket expressions in the Lagrangian are written in such a way 
that they are concave in the state or control variables involved. 
If economies of scale exist, as they do, the K function may become 
concave. In such cases the optimal value of Bj(t), j e I^ may be 
either zero or only bounded by the budget constraint. Such situations 
are mathematically less tractable than when the neoclassical type of 
assumptions are made about the K function. 
It may be noted that though we have assumed the K function to be 
smooth, the same assumption was not made about the z  function which 
is only assumed to be piecewise-smooth in each b., i el . One reason 
J m 
for such nonsmoothness is the presence of limitational inputs in the 
"production process" of any product. It is the latter feature that 
is brought into prominence in the growth models we have discussed. 
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